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Article 4

NULL PREEMPTION
Jonathan Remy Nash*
How free should thefederal government be, not only to preempt state regulatory law, but also to choose itself to adopt no law on point? Such instances of
"null preemption" have been historically rare, but now are occurring with
greaterfrequency. Consider that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
refused to allow states to impose standards governing motor vehicle tailpipe
greenhouse-gas emissions, and also argued that it could not, or alternatively
would not, issue any federal regulations. Further, though the Supreme Court
rejected the EPA's arguments, two years have since passed with no EPA action.
The regulatory voids resultingfrom such instances of "nullpreemption"
are rarely normatively justified. Even if states lack a normativejustification
for regulating, still the structure of the federal system means that null preemption offends states' sovereign prerogative to protect their citizens. Moreover, it is
far more likely, not that the states lack any normativejustification, but that
there is a normative dispute between federal and state government over the propriety of regulation. Only rarely-suchas when thefederalgovernment seeks to
avoid interstate externalities and the cost of national regulation outweighs its
benefit-will null preemption be justified.
@ 2010 Jonathan Remy Nash. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. The author was a Visiting
Professor of Law at The University of Chicago Law School for the 2007-2008
academic year, and until 2008 was the Robert C. Cudd Professor of Environmental
Law at Tulane Law School.
For helpful discussions and suggestions, I am grateful to Adeno Addis, William
Buzbee, Clifford Carrubba, Adam Cox, Claire Dickerson, Onnig Dombalagian,
Richard Epstein, Allan Erbsen, Brian Galle, Jacob Gersen, Jennifer Johnson, Martin
Lederman, Glynn Lunney, Dan Markel, Jonathan Masur, John McGinnis, Cherie
Metcalf, Lori Greendorfer Nash, Richard Revesz, Gregory Riggs, Catherine Sharkey,
Frederick Tung, Johan van der Vyver, Liza Vertinsky, Keith Werhan, and Kathryn
Zeiler. I also benefited greatly from presentations at the annual meeting of the
Canadian Law and Economics Association, at law and economics workshops at
Georgetown University Law Center and the Law Faculty of Queen's University, and at
faculty workshops at Emory University School of Law and Tulane Law School.
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Null preemption should accordingly be limited. Congress can statutorily
limit federal regulators'freedomto engage in null preemption. Courts should
react skeptically to assertions of null preemption, especially where regulators
make such assertions without indication of supporting congressional intent.
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INTRODUCTION

How free should the federal government be, not only to preempt
state regulatory law, but also to choose itself to adopt no law on point?
Federal preemption of state law has drawn a great deal of academic
attention in recent years.' Commentators have drawn distinctions
between "floor" preemption and "ceiling" preemption, 2 and have
questioned the validity of preemptions effected not by Congress, but
I See, e.g., Symposium, Ordering State-Federal Relations Through Federal Preemption
Doctrine, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 503 (2008).
2 See William W. Buzbee, Interaction'sPromise: Preemption Policy Shifts, Risk Regulation, and Experimentalism Lessons, 57 EMORY L.J. 145, 147-48 (2007).
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by federal agencies. 3 Throughout this literature-and the casesruns the assumption that preemption involves (1) the preemption of
state law (2) by some federal standard.4
Both floor and ceiling preemption contemplate that the federal
government has established some level of federal regulation. Commentators have not paid much attention to the possibility that the federal government might preempt state law without providing any
federal regulation, thus leaving a vacuum. It is this type of setting,
which I term one of "null preemption," on which I focus in this
Article.
While null preemption has been historically uncommon, recent
years have seen more occurrences. Recent litigation involving the regulation of greenhouse-gas emissions from motor vehicles' tailpipes
provides an important example. In response to litigation by states to
compel the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate such emissions, the federal government argued (unsuccessfully in
the end) that it lacked authority so to regulate.5 In the meantime, in
litigation involving states' ability to impose limits on such emissions,
courts have held that such state laws are preempted unless a waiver is
obtained from the federal government.6 In Massachusetts v. EPA,7 the
Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the EPA had authority to regulate motor vehicle tailpipe emissions;" after that, the EPA denied
states a waiver to regulate themselves. 9 Taken as a whole, then, the
position of EPA (albeit rejected in part by the Supreme Court) was
that it lacked authority to regulate motor vehicle tailpipe greenhousegas emissions and that, absent a waiver (which it denied), neither did
the states. In other words, the position of the federal government was
that there was null preemption of motor vehicle tailpipe greenhousegas emissions. Moreover, even in the wake of the Massachusetts case,
the EPA declined to take regulatory action. 10 Only under the new
leadership of the Obama administration-and two years after the
3 See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/CeilingDistinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1547, 1549-50 (2007) (framing questions
about the role of federal preemption with this underlying assumption).
5 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511-14 (2007) (summarizing the EPA's
argument that it lacked authority to regulate the emissions).
6 See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
7 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
8 Id. at 528-32.
9 See infra note 66.
10 See infta note 57 and accompanying text.
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Court handed down its decision in Massachusetts-is the EPA preparing to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions."
By depriving states of their ability to regulate and leaving a federal regulatory void as well, null preemption infringes upon states'
sovereignty. It also impedes the ability of states to ensure the health
and safety of their constituents.
I argue here that suggestions of null preemption should be subject to considerable scrutiny. Still, it is important to understand the
scope of my claim in this regard: The fact that null preemption should
be viewed skeptically does not mean that regulation should necessarily
be favored over the absence of regulation. There may be situations
where an absolute absence of regulation-in favor of simple market
forces, for example-is normatively desirable. The answer to that
question is distinct, however, from the question of which institution or
institutions should be vested with authority to decide it. Under our
federal system of government, the federal government and state governments have the power to regulate (or to decline to regulate). Null
preemption raises the question of when one government-the federal
government-should not only decide that it ought not to regulate,
but also that it should deprive state governments of the prerogative to
make a similar call.' 2
The propriety of null preemption thus boils down to a question
of how confident the federal government is that a setting of no regulation is absolutely appropriate. This understanding refines the claim
about the rare normative desirability of null preemption. There may
be settings where the federal government is convinced that a state government normatively errs by promulgating regulation. Even if the
state government lacks a valid normative justification for its regula11 See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15. 2009); John
M. Broder, E.P.A. Expected to Regulate CarbonDioxide and OtherHeat-TrappingGases, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, at A15.
12 See Ernest A. Young, Federal Preemption and State Autonomy, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION 249, 255 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) ("The Constitution
. . . does not enact laissez faire economics; it does enact a basic balance of authority
between state and federal governments.").
Note that, despite the usual sense in which government regulation is seen to
impinge upon individual rights, regulation may sometimes be deployed to enhance
people's rights by, for example, recognizing enforceable property rights. Thus, in
Goldstein v. California,412 U.S. 546 (1973), the Court held that states could enforce
laws criminalizing the piracy of sound recordings, even though Congress had affirmatively declined to afford copyright protection to sound recordings. Id. at 571. In
rejecting an argument for effective null preemption, the Court upheld states' ability
to afford greater rights to their citizens than were created under federal law. Id.
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tion, the fact remains that our federal system assumes that benefits
arise from generally leaving state governments free to regulate where
the federal government declines to do so. Those benefits dissipate
when the federal government acts to displace state government regulatory freedom.
But the state may have a normative basis for wishing to regulate.
The federal government may be wrong about the state's lack of normative justification. More likely, there may be a dispute between the
federal and state governments as to the proper normative measure or
approach. Perhaps the state government does not believe that costbenefit analysis should justify regulation, while the federal government does; or the state and federal governments agree on the validity
of cost-benefit analysis, yet they disagree as to the assumptions underlying that analysis; or the state government takes a more precautionary
approach than does the federal government. In such settings, is the
federal government justified in unilaterally opting for no regulation?
To be sure, there may be settings where the federal government
is justified in giving rise to null preemption. For example, the federal
government might have determined that federal regulation is unjustified and also that state regulation would impose substantial externalities on other states. As a general matter, however, null preemption
will rarely be normatively justified.
The propriety of null preemption also should turn on the particular federal actors that, it is claimed, have generated the null preemption. Null preemption requires two steps: (1) the choice of no federal
regulation, and (2) the preemption of state law by the federal government.1 3 Null preemption is more acceptable when the legislature
effects both these steps. In contrast, assertions of null preemption
should be received more skeptically to the extent that the executive
branch has effected these steps. Indeed, considerations of political
economy suggest that societal actors may more and more be turning
to executive branch actors to attain null preemption when it was previously thought to be unattainable.
I make four broad contributions in this Article. First, I explore
the contours of null preemption. I also develop a typology of settings
in which null preemption may arise. Professor Robert Glicksman has
identified one intentional setting of null preemption, to which I refer
as "regulatory inaction null preemption."14 My comprehensive taxon13 See infra Part I.B.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 161-64; see generally Robert L. Glicksman,
Nothing Is Real: Protecting the Regulatory Void Through Federal Preemption by Inaction, 26
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omy includes null preemption settings that are either intentional or
unintentional and accidental, and that are either clear or ambiguous.
Second, I consider the normative desirability of null preemption.
I argue that the class of cases in which it is desirable is a small one.
Even if the federal and state governments disagree over what is normatively desirable, there will rarely be justification for the federal government to impose its normative values onto state governments and
thus to deprive the state governments of their sovereign prerogative. I
also apply the normative framework to the various taxonomical settings of null preemption.
Third, I describe the political economy of null preemption. I
explain that null preemption has heretofore been rare. But I also
argue that occurrences of null preemption are on the rise, thanks primarily to executive branch action (or inaction, as the case may be).
Fourth, given the narrow normative case for null preemption, I
suggest ways in which Congress might legislatively constrain the freedom of the executive branch to give rise to null preemption where
Congress does not intend to allow for that possibility. I suggest that
Congress might either promulgate "background" rules that apply in
the absence of regulatory action, or preclude preemption of state law
unless and until regulators generate affirmative federal regulations in
an area.
I also offer recommendations for courts that are called upon to
examine situations in which null preemption is claimed. I first suggest that states, as sovereigns, be given special latitude in terms of
standing in federal court to pursue allegations of null preemption.
Second, I suggest that evidence of null preemption should make it
more likely for courts to grant relief to a state alleging that the federal
government has improperly failed to regulate, or has improperly preempted state law. And, third, I suggest that perhaps a special cause of
action be created to allow states to challenge null preemption.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I introduce the concept of null preemption. I discuss in greater detail the case of regulation of motor vehicle tailpipe greenhouse-gas emissions as a case study
of null preemption. In Part II, I explore the contours of null preemption, and then describe, and distinguish among, several paradigmatic
settings in which null preemption may arise.
In Part III, I consider the normative case for null preemption. I
conclude that the case is narrow. I also consider concerns of institutional choice and argue that even those who generally defend agency
ENvrL. L.J. 5 (2008) (considering "when inaction by either Congress or a federal
regulatory agency should be deemed to preempt state law").
VA.
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preemption of state law should be wary of "back door" assertions of
null preemption by agencies, and should therefore support some congressional constraints on regulatory freedom.
In Part IV, I consider how concerns of political economy may
explain why null preemption has historically been uncommon, but
may become more common in the future. Finally, in Part V, I offer
suggestions as to how Congress might constrain regulators from invoking null preemption, and also for courts called upon to review
claimed occurrences of null preemption.
I.

ExAMPLEs OF NULL PREEMPTION

In essence, null preemption arises where two things happen:
(1) the federal government establishes a "zero level" of federal regulation, and (2) the federal government preempts the states from filling
the regulatory void.' 5 In this Part, I offer some examples of null preemption. I focus on the regulation of motor vehicle tailpipe greenhouse-gas emissions as a case study, after which I discuss some
additional examples.
A.

A Case Study in Null Preemption: The Regulation of Motor Vehicle
Greenhouse-Gas Emissions

The scientific community first began to acknowledge and analyze
the problem of global warming nearly fifty years ago.16 Despite that,
Congress has declined to enact legislation directed specifically against
the problem.17 The growing consensus in recent decades among
scientists about the reality, and seriousness, of global warming" led to
an increase in legislative proposals to address global warming, but in
the end did not result in any enacted laws.1 9 On the international
treaty front, 20 the United States entered into the preliminary Framework Convention on Climate Change2 ' in 1992, but it was with near
unanimous senatorial opposition that President Clinton declined to
15 See infra Part II.B.
16 For an overview of the science and public policy issues related to global warming, see Jonathan Remy Nash, Standing and the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 108 COLUM. L.
REv. 494, 507-08 (2008).
17 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511-12 (2007).
18 See Nash, supra note 16, at 507.
19 See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
20 For additional discussion, see generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Beyond Kyoto: The
Treatment of Outliers,15 U.C. DAVISJ. INT'L L. & POL. 31 (2008) (explaining the history
and questionable future of the treaty regime addressing climate change).
21 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 29, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
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submit the Kyoto Protocol 2 2-which, by its terms, imposed limits on
national greenhouse-gas emissionS23-for ratification. 24
As a general matter, Congress has not passed laws directed
against specific air pollutants. Instead, Congress has delegated broad
authority under the Clean Air Act 25 (CAA) to address air pollution.
While Congress devolved authority on the EPA and the states to identify and achieve safe and acceptable ambient levels of air pollution, 26
motor vehicle regulation receives special treatment under the Act.
Section 202 (a) of the CAA directs the EPA Administrator to prescribe,
by regulation, "standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare." 27 Section 209(a) of the CAA provides that "[n]o
State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to
enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part."2 8
Section 209(b) empowers a state to generate motor vehicle emissions
standards more stringent than the federal standard, provided that a
22 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162.
23 See id. art. 3, 2303 U.N.T.S. at 216-18.
24 See Nash, supra note 16, at 507 n.62.
25 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
26 The CAA directs the EPA Administrator to identify "air pollutant[s] .. . emissions of which, in his judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endahger public health or welfare." CAA § 110(a) (1), 42
U.S.C. § 7408(a) (1) (A). For each such pollutant, the EPA is to generate primary and
secondary "national ambient air quality standards"-or "NAAQS"-that represent the
maximum ambient levels of the pollutant appropriate to protect the public health
and welfare, respectively. See id. § 109(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b). The states are then
directed to generate "implementation plans" that explain how they will comply with
the NAAQS. See id. § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
There are currently only six pollutants for which NAAQS have been issued. Since
the enactment of the CAA in 1970, the EPA has identified only one additional criterion air pollutant-lead-and that was after the EPA had been compelled by court
order to do so. The EPA has never identified a criterion air pollutant based on its
status as a greenhouse gas. Greenhouse gases thus remain essentially unregulated
under the heart of the CAA.
27 Id. § 201(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (1).
28 Id. § 209(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). The provision adds: "No State shall require
certification, inspection, or any other approval relating to the control of emissions
from any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as condition precedent to
the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration of such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equipment." Id.

2010]

NULL PREEMPTION

1023

waiver from the federal government is obtained. 29 The statute provides that the federal government "shall" grant such a waiver unless
either (1) the state's determination of its standard is "arbitrary or
capricious";30 (2) the state does not need a state standard to "meet
compelling and extraordinary circumstances";31 or (3) the state's standard and accompanying enforcement procedures "are not consistent"
with federal standards.3 2 If such a waiver is provided, then section 177
authorizes other states to choose between the standards of the federal
government and California.3 3
Section 209(a) is a broad preemption provision. 34 By its own
terms, it preempts any state standard "relating to the control of emissions."3 5 And the Supreme Court has interpreted its reach broadly.3 6
In sum, then, with respect to motor vehicle emissions, Congress's
vision seems to have been that the EPA would identify, and develop
regulations for, any air pollutant, the emission of which by motor vehicles, "in [the EPA Administrator's] judgment, cause [s] or contribute [s] to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to
endanger public health or welfare."3 In order to protect automobile
manufacturers from a patchwork of regulations, Congress broadly preempted state law, allowing states the freedom only to choose between
federal emissions standards and stricter standards promulgated by
California.38
But that vision is not the only way to understand the statutory
framework. And, indeed, recent litigation positions taken by the federal government, combined with the states' understanding that they
need a waiver from the EPA to regulate tailpipe greenhouse-gas emissions and the EPA's decision to deny such waiver requests,3 9 combine
to suggest that the federal government's understanding of the statutory framework did not work toward that vision, but rather frustrated
it. It seems that the executive branch understood Congress to have
29
30

See id. § 209(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).
Id. § 209(b) (1) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (1) (A).

31

Id. § 209(b) (1) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (1) (B).

32 Id. § 209(b) (1) (C), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (1) (C).
33 See id. § 177, 42 U.S.C. § 7507.
34 See id. § 209(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).
35 Id.
36 See Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252-55
(2004) (precluding state imposition of rules applicable to public and private operators of fleets of vehicles that would have required the operators to purchase vehicles
that complied with state pollution reduction rules).
37 CAA § 108(a) (1) (A), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A).
38 See id. § 177, 42 U.S.C. § 7507.
39 See infta notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
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implemented-or at least to have approved of-a regime of null
preemption. 40
Let us consider first federal regulation of motor vehicle tailpipe
greenhouse-gas emissions. In Massachusetts v. EPA, several states
joined some environmental organizations in a challenge to the EPA's
failure to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions from motor vehicles. 4 1
The EPA resisted the challenge on three primary grounds: (1) that
the challengers lacked standing to bring their action to court, 42 (2)
that the EPA lacked statutory authority to regulate greenhouse
gases,4 3 and (3) that, even if it had authority, the EPA was within its
rights to decline to exercise that authority. 44
The Supreme Court heard the case and rejected each of these
arguments. First, relying upon what some contend to be a relaxing of
traditional standing requirements, 45 combined with recognition of
special solicitude for states as plaintiffs, 46 the Court dispatched the
EPA's challenge to standing. 47 The Court emphasized the fact that,
on the record before it, the EPA had failed to controvert Massachusetts's factual assertions about the dangers posed by global warming, 48
and the extent to which reductions in greenhouse-gas emissions-and
in particular greenhouse-gas emissions from U.S. motor vehicleswould help ameliorate the problem.4 9 The Court also rejected the
40 See infra notes 71-74, 125 and accompanying text.
41 The environmental organizations were the original plaintiffs, with the states
intervening. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 511, 514 (2007).
42 Id. at 517.
43 Id. at 528.
44 Id. at 532-33.
45 This was certainly the view of the Chief Justice in dissent. See id. at 540-46
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
46 See id. at 518-20 (majority opinion).
47 Specifically, the Court found that Massachusetts had sufficiently established
harm, causation, and redressability. See id. at 521-26. For a critique of the Court's
approach, see Nash, supra note 16, at 524-25.
48 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521 ("EPA regards as an 'objective and independent assessment of the relevant science'" a report by the National Research Council
that "identifies a number of environmental changes that have already inflicted significant harms." (citations omitted) (quoting Control of Emissions from New Highway
Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,930 (Envtl. Prot. Agency Sept. 8,
2003))).
49 The Court explained: "We . . . attach considerable significance to EPA's
'agree[ment] with the President that we must address the issue of global climate
change,' and to EPA's ardent support for various voluntary emission-reduction programs." Id. at 526 (quoting Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and
Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,929) (internal quotation marks omitted). It further
acknowledged that, "[a]sJudge Tatel observed in dissent below, 'EPA would presumably not bother with such efforts if it thought emissions reductions would have no
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argument that Massachusetts's harm was too generalized to support
standing, reasoning that the potential loss of coastline was sufficient.5 0
The Court next concluded that the EPA had statutory authority
to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions. The Court held that the CAA's
"sweeping definition of 'air pollutant"' was "unambiguous" in its inclusion of greenhouse gases.5 1 It also rejected the argument that Congress's failure to enact specific legislation aimed at greenhouse-gas
emissions indicated intent to deprive EPA of the power to regulate
greenhouse-gas emissions under the CAA. 5 2
Finally, the Court considered the EPA's proffered justifications
for declining to exercise its power to regulate motor vehicle greenhouse-gas emissions: that a voluntary greenhouse-gas reduction program was sufficient to address the problem; that the decision to
regulate U.S. motor vehicle greenhouse-gas emissions would undermine the President's ability to negotiate an effective international
treaty to deal with the problem of global warming by removing a bargaining stick; and that a piecemeal response to global warming that
dealt with motor vehicle emissions separately from other sources was
undesirable.5 3 The Court explained:
Under the clear terms of the Clean Air Act, EPA can avoid taking
further action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not
contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable
explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to
determine whether they do.54
The Court found none of the proffered responses to meet this
criterion.5 5 It remanded the case to afford the EPA the opportunity to
deliver a valid justification for failing to regulate.5 6 Even in Massachudiscernable impact on future global warming.'" Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA,
415 F.3d 50, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
50 Id. at 521-23.
51 Id. at 528-29.
52 See id. at 529-31. As the Court explained:
Even if .. . postenactment legislative history could shed light on the meaning
of an otherwise-unambiguous statute, EPA never identifies any action
remotely suggesting that Congress meant to curtail its power to treat greenhouse gases as air pollutants. That subsequent Congresses have eschewed
enacting binding emissions limitations to combat global warming tells us
nothing about what Congress meant when it amended § 202(a) (1) in 1970
and 1977.
Id. at 529-30.
53 See id. at 533.
54 Id.
55 See id. at 533-35.
56 Id. at 535.
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setts's wake, however, the EPA declined so to regulate.5 7 Only now is
the EPA, under the new leadership of the Obama administrationand two years after the Court handed down its decision in Massachusetts-preparing to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions.5 8
In short, then, the executive branch argued in the Massachusetts
case that it lacked power to, and in any event could decide not to,
regulate motor vehicle tailpipe greenhouse-gas emissions.5 9 Even
though it lost the case, moreover, it continued-for a period of
years-to decline to regulate those emissions.
Let us consider now federal government preemption of state
authority to regulate motor vehicle tailpipe greenhouse-gas emissions.
While challenging the EPA's failure to regulate motor vehicle greenhouse-gas emissions, California also sought a waiver from the EPA to
impose greenhouse-gas emission level limits-in excess of the (nonexistent) federal limits-on California motor vehicles.6 0 Motor vehicle
manufacturers and distributors challenged California's proposaland other states' proposals to follow suit.6 1 Federal district courts in
Vermont and California rejected the automobile industry's initial
challenges to the state initiatives.62
Of importance here is the courts' treatment of the question of
whether the states required a waiver from the EPA before they could
act: Both courts agreed that a waiver was required. The California
district court specifically held that California's ability to enforce its
57 See Glicksman, supra note 14, at 14 & n.38; Jason Scott Johnston, Climate
Change Confusion and the Supreme Court: The Misguided Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 63 (2008).
58 See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Congress has recently considered
proposals to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions. See, e.g., American Clean Energy and
Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives,
June 26, 2009); America's Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong. (2007).
59 Massachusetts,549 U.S. at 528.
60 See Felicity Barringer, California Sues E.P.A. over Denial of Waiver, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 2008, at A14.
61 See Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon (Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep 1), 456 F.
Supp. 2d 1160, 1163 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
62 See Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp.
2d 295, 350 (D. Vt. 2007) (holding that Vermont regulations were not preempted);
Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstene (Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep II), 529 F. Supp. 2d
1151, 1190 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (rejecting on summary judgment claims that California
standards were preempted by the Energy Policy and Conservation Act and were unenforceable on foreign policy preemption grounds); Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep I, 456 F.
Supp. 2d at 1174, 1183-87 (dismissing on pleadings claims that California standards
violated the dormant Commerce Clause and were preempted by the Sherman Act,
and holding that the EPA waiver was needed to avoid Clean Air Act preemption).
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standard hinged on whether the EPA granted a waiver,63 while the
Vermont district court noted, "[T] he parties have proceeded with this
case on the assumption that EPA will grant California's waiver application. If it does not, of course, Vermont's regulation is preempted by
the CAA's section 209(a)."64 The Vermont court also observed that
"[t] he parties agree that enforcement of Vermont's [greenhouse gas]
standards is preempted by Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act ...
unless and until the EPA Administrator grants California a waiver
under Section

209(b)

. . . for its identical

[greenhouse gas]

regulations."6 5
After considerable administrative delay, the EPA in 2008 decided
to deny California's request for a waiver under Section 209.66 It reasoned that California does not need its greenhouse-gas standards for
new motor vehicles to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions,
as required by statute.6 7 California filed suit to challenge the waiver
denial,68 while Congress undertook an investigation of the denial's
propriety.6 9 Only recently has the new Obama administration
directed the EPA to reconsider the waiver denial.70
Let us now consider the null preemption of motor vehicle
tailpipe greenhouse-gas emissions, in light of the foregoing discussion
of federal regulation, and federal preemption of state regulation in
63 Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep1, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1174-75. In a subsequent opinion,
the district court noted that the state defendants had "acknowledge [d] and ... conceded in open court" the legal conclusion that "the new regulations could not be
enforced absent a waiver from EPA." Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep Inc. v. Witherspoon,
No. CV F 04-6663, 2007 WL 135688, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2007). The district
court's final holding furthers the point, stating that enforcement by California (and
other states) of the California motor vehicle greenhouse-gas standards was not barred
by foreign policy preemption where "California's . .. [r]egulations [are] granted [a]
waiver of preemption by EPA pursuant to section 209 of the Clean Air Act." Cent.
Valley Chrysler-Jeep IL 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1190.
64 Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 302.
65 Id. at 343 n.50 (citations omitted).
66 See Kevin M. Davis, The Road to Clean Air Is Paved with Many Obstacles: The U.S.
EnvironmentalProtection Agency Should Grant a Waiver for California to Regulate Automobile
Greenhouse Gas Emissions via Assembly Bill 1493, 19 FoRDIHus ENvTL. L. REv. 39, 93-95
(2009).
67 See California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California's 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73
Fed. Reg. 12,156-57 (Envtl. Prot. Agency Mar. 6, 2008).
68 See Barringer, supra note 60.
69 See Steven D. Cook, Waxman Opens Investigation into EPA Denial of California's
Greenhouse Gas Limit Waiver, 39 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 12, 12 (2008).
70 See John M. Broder & Peter Baker, Obama's Order Likely to Tighten Auto Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, at Al.
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the area. At the end of the day, motor vehicle greenhouse-gas emissions are not a setting of null preemption, insofar as the EPA now
(albeit two years after the decision in Massachusettswas handed down)
has moved to regulate those emissions.7 1 However, under very plausible assumptions, it does seem to be the case that the federal government's position was that there was null preemption. Specifically,
assume (as seems rational) that the government's view that California
(and other states) required a federal waiver to impose state-based
restrictions on motor vehicle greenhouse-gas emissions-and the government's decision to deny such a waiver-did not change by virtue of
the Court's decision in Massachusetts.7 2 Under those assumptions,
state regulation of motor vehicle greenhouse-gas emissions would be
entirely preempted. Now combine that conclusion with the government's three primary arguments in Massachusetts.73 If the states are
preempted from regulating and the EPA lacks authority to regulate
motor vehicle greenhouse-gas emissions, then there would be null
preemption. There would also be null preemption if the states are
preempted from regulating and the EPA, though it had authority to
regulate, simply declined to do so. And, finally, there would be effective null preemption if the states were preempted from regulating and
the states lack standing to challenge either the EPA's assertion that it
lacks authority to regulate, or equally the EPA's decision not to
regulate.
It thus is appropriate to understand the government's position
(at least based upon its arguments in, and its position in the wake of,
the Massachusetts litigation and upon its decision to deny California's
waiver request) as amounting to an assertion of null preemption.
Indeed, on this reasoning, had the Massachusettscase come out differently, one can readily envision a scenario under which null preemption would have obtained even more permanence.
Importantly, moreover, the MassachusettsCourt's decision against
the EPA's position notwithstanding, the EPA continued to decline to
71 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
72 While it is theoretically possible that the EPA might have acted differently with
respect to the need for California's waiver application, there is every reason to believe
that the EPA would have adhered to the view that California could not enforce its
motor vehicle greenhouse-gas emissions standards absent an EPA waiver. Indeed,
such was-even before the Court's holding in Massachusetts v. EPA-the holding of
the California district court, and thereafter a premise accepted by courts and parties
(including state governments) alike, And, similarly, while a contrary ruling in Massachusetts may have led the EPA to grant California's waiver request, it is far from inconceivable that the EPA still would have denied that request.
73 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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regulate motor vehicle tailpipe greenhouse-gas emissions in the two
years since that decision was handed down. 7 4 Practically speaking,
then, the EPA has effected null preemption in the area for years.
B.

Other Examples of Null Preemption

Regulation of motor vehicle tailpipe greenhouse-gas emissions is
not the only example of null preemption. The laws governing
national banking institutions provide another example. Under the
National Bank Act,7 5 Congress has authorized federally chartered
banking institutions to engage in various enumerated banking activities and "all ... incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking."7 6 Congress has subjected these institutions to
federal regulation and, "[t]o prevent inconsistent or intrusive state
regulation from impairing the national system," exempted them from
state regulation.7 7 The Supreme Court has interpreted the National
Bank Act to preclude the application of state laws regulating bank
advertising to federally chartered banks.7 8 It recently also held that
the broad preemption of state law extended to state chartered subsidiaries of national banks on the ground that national banks' incidental
powers include the option of operating through subsidiaries, even if
federal law did not entirely fill the resulting gap.79
Federal labor law provides another setting of null preemption.
Though the National Labor Relations Act8 o (NLRA) includes no
express preemption provision,8 1 the Supreme Court has interpreted
the NLRA to effect so-called "Machinists pre-emption"-that is, to preempt state regulation where Congress has evinced an intent for an
area to "be unregulated because left to be controlled by the free play
of economic forces." 82
See Broder, supra note 11.
12 U.S.C. §§ 21-216d (2006).
76 Id. § 24 (Seventh).
77 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 11 (2007); see also 12 U.S.C
§ 484(a) ("No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as author74

75

ized by Federal law . . . .").

78 See Franklin Nat'l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 377-79 (1954).
79 Watters, 550 U.S. at 41.
80 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
81 See Chamber of Commerce v. Brown, 128 S. Ct. 2408, 2412 (2008).
82 Id. (quoting Machinists v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132,
140 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 2417 ("We have characterized Machinistspre-emption as 'creat[ing] a zone free from all regulations, whether
state or federal.'" (quoting Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders &
Contractors of Mass./R.I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 227 (1993))).
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The federal securities laws offer yet another setting of null preemption. Prior to 1996, states had, under their blue sky laws and consistent with the federal securities laws, imposed so-called qualification
requirements-that is, minimal substantive requirements-on securities.8 3 In enacting the federal securities laws, in contrast, Congress
eschewed a qualification-based approach,8 4 opting instead for information regulation and disclosure.8 5 With the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 199686 (NSMIA), Congress expressly
precluded states from imposing qualification requirements on socalled "covered securities"-that is, in effect, securities that are either
traded, or could be traded, on a national stock exchange.8 7 Congress's goal seems to have been the desire for greater uniformity and
to eliminate what it perceived as duplicative regulation.8 8
The NSMIA may be seen to have effected null preemption in two
ways. First, the securities laws have long exempted from their reach
83 See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Insidious Remnants of State Rules Respecting
CapitalFormation,78 WASH. U. L.Q. 407, 410 (2000). These blue sky laws were seen to
be consistent with the federal securities laws (which postdated the blue sky laws)
because the federal laws took the different tack of requiring disclosure and imposing
procedural requirements, rather than substantive requirements, on issuers. See id.
84 President Franklin Roosevelt's initial request that Congress enact securities
regulation legislation specifically disclaimed the notion that the federal government
should "take any action which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that
newly issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will be maintained or
that the properties which they represent will earn profit." H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2
(1933). Nonetheless, early draft bills did call for federal qualification requirements.
SeeJames M. Landis, The Legislative History of the SecuritiesAct of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 29, 31-32 (1959). However, the draft bill that ultimately became the Securities
Act of 1933 "remained true to the conception . . . that its requirements should be
limited to full and fair disclosure of the nature of the security being offered and that
there should be no authority to pass upon the investment quality of the security." Id.
at 34.
85 See Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer Hill, Timing CorporateDisclosures to Maximize
Performance-BasedRemuneration: A Case of MisalignedIncentives?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
83, 92 & n.36 (2000).
86 Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 and 29 U.S.C.).
87 Since NSMIA, federal law precludes states from imposing qualification requirements on any "covered security." Securities Act of 1933 § 18(a)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C.
§ 77r(a) (1) (A) (2006). "Covered security" is defined to include any securities listed,
or to be listed, on a national stock exchange or the NASDAQ National Market and all
securities sold under Securities Act Rule 506, the SEC's private placement safe harbor. See id. §§ 18(b)(1)-(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)-(4); Renee M.Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its PerplexingRole in the CorporateGovernanceDebate, 41 WAKE FORESr L. REV.
879, 890 n.68 (2006).
88 See Campbell, supra note 83, at 411-12.
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"transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering,"8 9 which
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has implemented by
exempting private placements to sophisticated investors under Rule
506.90 The combination of NSMIA's preemption of state regulation
and Rule 506 leaves investors purchasing under Rule 506 without
traditional federal securities regulatory protection.9 1 Indeed, on this
basis, some have argued that the regulatory void be undone.9 2
The NSMIA may also be seen to have created a null preemption
that goes beyond the bounds of the statutory and regulatory exemption for transactions not involving private offerings. To the extent
that the SEC is not authorized to impose qualification requirements9 3
and that the NSMIA precludes the states from doing so with respect to
covered securities,9 4 then qualification requirements have been
entirely preempted with respect to all covered securities. Does that
amount to null preemption? The answer, it seems, turns on one's perspective. If one subscribes to the view that congressional preemption
was warranted by virtue of the fact that qualitative requirements were
duplicative of the federal securities laws,9 5 then there does not seem
to be null preemption; the federal securities laws continue to regulate.
On this understanding, the federal laws' disclosure requirements and
Securities Act of 1933 § 18(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2).
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2009).
See Jennifer J. Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Black Hole, 35 DEL. J.
CORP. L. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 34-36).
92 See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 49-61); G. Philip Rutledge, NSMIA ... One Year
Later: The States' Response, 53 Bus. IAw. 563, 565-66 (1998) (arguing that the regulatory void might allow persons with disciplinary records to purvey stocks under Rule
506). The North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) has listed
the "[Reinstatement ofJ State Regulatory Authority of Regulation D 506 Offerings" as
part of its 2008 Agenda. See N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, 2008 Pro-Investor Legislative
Agenda para. 8 (2008), http://www.nasaa.org/content/Files/NASAALegislativeAgenda_2008.pdf. But see Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private
State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REv. 273, 332 (1998) (arguing that
because "large private placements to institutional or other sophisticated investors are
typically sold in interstate commerce," and "sophisticated investors [are] capable of
protecting themselves, additional state causes of action are likely unnecessary").
93 If instead it were empowered, but nonetheless declined, to do so, then null
preemption would still apply, but it would be of the type discussed below-where
Congress preempts state law and executive branch inaction generates a level of "zero
regulation."
94 See Securities Act of 1933 § 18(a) (1) (A), 15 U.S.C. § 77r-1 (a) (1) (A); John C.
Coffee, Jr., & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better Idea?,
95 VA. L. REv. 707, 763 (2009).
95 See, e.g., Roberta S. Karmel, Blue-Sky Merit Regulation: Benefit to Investors or Burden on Commerce?, 53 BROOK. L. REv. 105, 116-24 (1987); Perino, supra note 92, at
318-29.
89
90
91
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qualification requirements are different means to the same end; as
long as a path to an end remains regulated, there is no null preemption. Put another way, a choice by the federal government among
possible regulatory tools should not be seen as null preemption. On
the other hand, if one disagrees and sees a role for qualification
requirements separate and apart from disclosure requirements-as
some do 96-then the NSMIA's preemption of state and federal qualification requirements is an example of null preemption.
As another example of null preemption, consider the fate of New
York State's airline passenger "bill of rights," 9 7 enacted in response to
a series of episodes in which airline passengers sat for hours on aircraft, often without provision of food or water.98 In Air TransportAss'n
v. Cuomo,99 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found
the New York State provision to be preemptedoo by the preemption
provision of the Federal Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.101 The
court recognized that, while New York State was trying to fill a regulatory void,102 this was not because the federal government lacked the
power to regulate or because the federal government had affirmatively decided not to generate any such regulation. To the contrary,
the court noted that the Federal Department of Transportation was
96 See, e.g., Manning Gilbert Warren III, Refiections on Dual Regulation of Securities:
A Case Against Preemption, 25 B.C. L. REV. 495, 527-37 (1984).
97 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 251-g (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2009).
98 SeeJeff Bailey, Long Delays Hurt Image ofJetBlue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, at Cl
(describing episode in which, in wake of ice storm, nine JetBlue Airlines aircraft sat
on the tarmac atJohn F. Kennedy International Airport for anywhere between six and
ten hours); John Doyle et al., Air 'Refugees'inNew]ffKaos: Hordes Camp Overnight Before
jetBlue Says: Tough Luck, No Flights, N.Y. PosT, Feb. 16, 2007, at 10 (same);Joe Sharkey,
After 8 Hours on the Taxiway, You Might Want a Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 30, 2007,
at C8 (describing a similar episode on an American Airlines aircraft at Dallas-Fort
Worth International Airport).
99 520 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2008).
100 Id. at 220.
101 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18, 26, and 49 U.S.C.). The Act's preemption provision states that
a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of at least 2
States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having
the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart.
49 U.S.C. § 41,713(b) (1) (2006).
102 Other states had proposed similar legislation. See Air Transp. Ass'n, 520 F.3d at
224 n.1; see also David K. Randall, Legislator Callsfor an Airline Passenger 'Bill of Rights',
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2007, at NJ2 (noting New Jersey legislator's call to emulate New
York's passenger bill of rights).
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considering "several similar passenger protection measures that could
provide uniform standards to deal with lengthy ground delays."10 3
Finally, consider the holding of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola,
Inc. 04 There, the manufacturer and promoter of handheld electronic
devices defended against the claim of the National Basketball Association (NBA) that it had misappropriated NBA intellectual propertythe statistics of live NBA games that were transmitted to the electronic
devices-in violation of New York law on the ground that New York
law was preempted by the Federal Copyright Act. 0 5 The court upheld
this argument, explicitly holding that, though the games and statistics
themselves (as opposed to television and radio broadcasts of the
games) were not subject to federal copyright protection, Congress
intended the Copyright Act's preemption provision to extend even to
materials not subject to the copyright act: "Copyrightable material
often contains uncopyrightable elements within it, but [the Act's preemption provision] bars state law misappropriation claims with
respect to uncopyrightable as well as copyrightable elements." 0 6 The
court reasoned that Congress had intended the scope of preemption
to be broader than the scope of federal copyright:
Adoption of a partial preemption doctrine-preemption of claims
based on misappropriation of broadcasts but no preemption of
claims based on misappropriation of underlying facts-would
expand significantly the reach of state law claims and render the
preemption intended by Congress unworkable. . .. Congress, in
extending copyright protection only to the broadcasts and not to
the underlying events, intended that the latter be in the public
domain. Partial preemption turns that intent on its head by
allowing state law to vest exclusive rights in material that Congress
intended to be in the public domain and to make unlawful conduct
that Congress intended to allow. 07
II.

THE

CONTOURS

OF

NULL PREEMPTION

In this Part, I consider the contours of null preemption. I first
explicate null preemption to consist of two "steps": the preemption of
103 Air Transp. Ass'n, 520 F.3d at 224 n.1. Only late last year did the Department
of Transportation in fact formally promulgate such measures. See Enhancing Airline
Passenger Protections, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,983 (Dec. 30, 2009).
104 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
105 Id. at 843, 848-53; see also 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2006) (providing for federal preemption of state copyright law).
106 Nat'1 Basketball Ass'n, 105 F.3d at 849.
107 Id.
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state law and the choice of a "zero level" of federal regulation. I then
consider which federal government actors-the legislature or an executive branch actor-might effect each of these steps. Next, I focus on
the "preemption step" and ask what types of preemption-express
preemption, implied conflict preemption, or field preemptionmight appropriately be used to attain null preemption.
A.

What Null Preemption Is Not

Null preemption is a setting in which there is a regulatory void;
the private market controls. It is helpful to situate null preemption
among other settings in which there is no regulation. While similar to
null preemption in this sense, these other settings differ from null
preemption in important ways.
Consider first settings in which there is simply neither federal nor
state (nor local) regulation, but also no preemption. Here, unlike a
setting of null preemption, the regulatory void that inheres can be
displaced by government at any level enacting regulation. Null preemption's regulatory void can be dissipated only when either the federal government dissolves its affirmative preemption of state law 08
and the state government regulates, or the federal government itself
chooses to regulate.
Consider next areas in which the Constitution preempts regulation. For example, the First Amendment precludes Congress from
enacting laws "abridging the freedom of speech."10 9 Insofar as the
Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to incorporate this prohibition also against the states, 110 the net result is that speech is an
area largely void of regulation. The extent to which this regulatory
void is ensconced is confirmed by the oft-repeated description of the
First Amendment as allowing speech to flourish or fail in a "market108 When I speak of the federal government "affirmatively" preempting state law, I
mean only that the federal government takes some affirmative step to preempt state
law. I thus do not mean to exclude implied conflict preemption or implied field
preemption. As I shall discuss below, however, neither of these types of preemption is
likely to underlie null preemption; rather, express preemption is. See infra Part
II.B.2.b.
109 U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
110 In its original form, the First Amendment divested Congress of the power to
"abridg[e] the freedom of speech." U.S. CONsT. amend. I. Analogous preemption of
state law arises from the Supreme Court's decisions that incorporate the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause that limits the powers of
the states. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 779-80 (1978)
(finding freedom of speech to be a "fundamental component of the liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause"); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)
(same).
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place of ideas.""' All laws that courts deem to abridge the freedom of
speech are preempted, and the preemption is absolute (absent constitutional amendment). In contrast, for null preemption to arise, the
federal government must both (1) affirmatively preempt state law,
and (2) choose not to enact regulations itself.
A close constitutional analog of null preemption is found in dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. The Commerce Clause conveys a positive grant of authority to the federal government to regulate
interstate commerce.112 However, the Court has long interpreted the
Clause also to include a negative component that precludes certain
state regulation, even in the absence of federal regulation'" 3 (except
to the extent that Congress may expressly authorize the states to regulate). 1 14 Like null preemption, the dormant Commerce Clause
involves preemption of state law and often (in the absence of any federal law) no federal regulation. 15 In contrast to null preemption,
which requires some affirmative federal preemption of state law, however, the dormant Commerce Clause presumes an absence of regulation.1 6 As a corollary, null preemption (as I have defined it) will
never arise where the dormant Commerce Clause already preempts
state law.
Table 1 summarizes the features and distinctions of these various
settings where a regulatory void may arise.

111 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
("By protecting those who wish to enter the marketplace of ideas from government
attack, the First Amendment protects the public's interest in receiving information.").
112 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (empowering Congress "[to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States.").
113 See, e.g., City of Phila. v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) ("[W]here simple
economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected."). Another possible source of preemption arguably grounded in
the Constitution is foreign affairs preemption. For a discussion and critique of foreign affairs preemption, see generally Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs:
Rethinking HorizontalFederalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of TranslocalInternationalism, 57 EMORY L.J. 31, 74-78 (2007).
114 For discussion, see Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1468, 1480-85 (2007).
115 See, e.g., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977)
(noting that the Commerce Clause, "'by its own force created an area of trade free
from interference by the States'" (quoting Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252

(1946))).
116 See City of Phila., 437 U.S. at 620-21 & n.4.
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1. COMPARISON OF SETTINGS IN WHICH A REGULATORY VOID
MAY ARISE

Setting
Simple Absence of
Regulation
Freedom of Speech
Guarantee
Dormant Commerce
Clause
Null Preemption

B.

.
Nature of Preemption

Reason for Absence of
Federal Regulation

None

Decision by federal
government
Preempted by
Constitution
Decision by federal
government

Constitutional; selfexecuting
Constitutional; selfexecuting
Non-constitutional;
requires affirmative
preemption

Denbedr

The Two Steps of Null Preemption: Preemption and a "Zero Level" of
Federal Regulation

Typical preemption may be seen to consist of two "steps" or "moving parts," so to speak: first, the preemption of state law and, second,
the implementation of some federal standard. Null preemption also
involves two steps. First, the federal government must preempt state
law (the "preemption step"). Second, the federal government must
establish a "zero level" of federal regulation (the "zero federal regulation step"). In this section, I first consider which actors might effect
each step, and I then explore these two steps in the context of null
preemption.
1.

The Actors that Effect the Two Steps

In theory, the legislature, or an executive branch actor, could
effect each of the two steps necessary for null preemption.1 17 There
are thus, in theory, four possible combinations: Congress could effect
both steps ("Type I null preemption"), Congress could preempt state
law and an executive branch actor could choose a zero level of federal
regulation ("Type II null preemption"), an executive branch actor
could preempt state law and Congress could choose a zero level of
federal regulation ("Type III null preemption"), or an executive
branch actor could effect both steps ("Type IV null preemption").
Table 2 organizes these possibilities.
117 Thejudiciary may also have a role in recognizing (or rejecting) assertions of
either step of null preemption. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing
Machinists preemption).
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Which Actor Chooses a Zero Level of
Federal Regulation?

Which Actor
Preempts State
Law?

Congress
Executive Branch
Actor

Congress

Executive Branch
Actor

Type I

Type II

Type III

Type IV

As an initial matter, the practice of an executive branch department or agency preempting state law, even in favor of an affirmative
form of federal regulation, is relatively novel and fairly controversial.1 18 The notion that the executive branch would preempt state law
118 For a description of the practice, see, for example, William Funk, Preemption by
Federal Agency Action, in PREEMPTION CHOICE 214, 215-24 (William W. Buzbee ed.,
2009); Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: FederalAgencies and the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 227, 229-42 (2007) [hereinafter Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble].
The Supreme Court has yet to resolve agency power to preempt. See, e.g., Robert
R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson, Preemption and Theories ofFederalism, in PREEMPTION
CHOICE, supra at 13, 27 (noting that the Court skirted the issue in Watters v. Wachovia
Bank N.A., 559 U.S. 1 (2007)). Commentators are divided over the question. Compare
Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 695,
708-25 (2008) (arguing that institutional competence and separation of powers
weigh in favor of Congress making preemption choices, and so the standard presumption against preemption should apply with even greater force against agency preemption), Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and InstitutionalChoice, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 727,
766-69 (2008) (contending that courts should uphold agency preemption only where
Congress has delegated such authority), Mark D. Rosen, Contextualizing Preemption,
102 Nw. U. L. REv. 781, 796-800 (2008) (emphasizing, despite its shortcomings, Congress's institutional advantages in making preemption decisions), Verchick & Mendelson, supra,at 27 (taking a skeptical view of agency preemption), and Ernest A. Young,
Executive Preemption, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 869 (2008) (advocating restricting the freedom of agencies to preempt unilaterally), with Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law's Federalism: Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of FederalPower,
57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1990 (2008) (arguing that agencies may be better positioned than
Congress to decide whether preemption of state law is appropriate), Gillian E. Metzger, AdministrativeLaw as the New Federalism,57 DUKE L.J. 2023, 2069-72 (2008) (arguing that existing administrative law requirements may facilitate the inclusion of states'
interests in administrative decisions), Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An InstitutionalApproach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 449, 477-502 (2008) [hereinafter Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption] (arguing in favor of agency reference of
preemption decisions, with judicial review to ensure proper administrative process),
and Catherine M. Sharkey, What Riegel Portendsfor FDA Preemption of State Law Products
Liability Claims, 103 Nw. U. L. REv. 437, 441-46 (2009) [hereinafter Sharkey, What
Riegel Portends] (same). See generally William W. Buzbee, State Greenhouse Gas Regulation, FederalClimate Change Legislation, and the Preemption Sword, 1 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE
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and also announce a decision to impose no federal regulation goes
considerably farther and exceeds, at least at present, the behavior of
executive branch departments and agencies. Accordingly, Type IV
null preemption should, one would expect, be exceedingly rare. Type
III null preemption may also be relatively uncommon.
Much more common will be hybrids where Congress and an
executive branch actor together give rise to the steps of null preemption, or where arguments are made in the alternative that either Congress or an executive branch actor has given rise to one or both
steps. 119 Consider the purported null preemption of motor vehicle
greenhouse-gas emissions.1 20 The preemption seems to have been
accomplished jointly by the legislative and executive branches. As I
described above, the states understood themselves to be obliged by
congressional statute to seek a waiver from the federal government to
regulate tailpipe greenhouse-gas emissions beyond the (nonexistent)
level of federal regulation. 12 1 But it was an agency-the EPA-that
ultimately denied the requests for those waivers.' 2 2
Consider now that the zero federal-regulation step was argued to
be, alternatively, the result of congressional or executive branch
action. Part of the EPA's argument in Massachusetts v. EPA was that
the EPA lacked the statutory authority-i.e., that Congress had failed
to confer authority on the EPA-to regulate tailpipe greenhouse-gas
emissions.123 And the EPA sought further to buttress the resilience of
its interpretation of the congressional grant by arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the EPA's inaction.124 Taking the
federal government's position on the two points together, then, the
government understood Congress to have preempted state law regulating greenhouse-gas emissions from motor vehicles (absent a waiver)
and also not to have authorized the EPA to regulate those
emissions.' 2 5
& ENERGY L. 23 (2009) (arguing in favor of independent "Preemption Review Committee" that would render preemption decisions in problematic settings based on statutory criteria and record evidence).
119 One also might envision some forms of null preemption, such as Machinists
preemption, as a hybrid resulting from a combination of congressional and judicial
action.
120 See supra Part I.A.
121 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
122 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
123 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
124 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
125 Other examples of congressional null preemption can be found in federal preemption of banking laws, securities laws, and labor law. See supra Part I.B.
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Another understanding (again, ultimately rejected by the Court
in Massachusetts) of the regulation of tailpipe greenhouse-gas emissions sees the executive branch as effecting a zero level of federal regulation. One of the arguments advanced by the federal government
in Massachusetts was that, even if the EPA had authority to regulate
tailpipe greenhouse-gas emissions, it justifiably declined to exercise
that authority. 126 That position, combined with the federal government's understanding that states could not regulate such emissions
absent a waiver from the federal government,127 leads to a condition
of null preemption. And, as above, the EPA's additional argument on
standing serves further to insulate the null preemption condition. 2 8
2.

The Two Steps of Null Preemption
a.

The Zero Federal Regulation Step

Under the zero federal regulation step, the federal government
adopts a zero level of regulation. This raises an important question:
How special a case is null preemption? One might at first blush think
that null preemption is simply a case (albeit an extreme one) of ordinary preemption, where the federal government preempts state law
and establishes a very low level of federal regulation. If that is true,
then null preemption deserves no treatment different from ordinary
preemption settings. Indeed, were this the case and were null preemption to receive a more hostile reception in court, then the federal
government, frustrated in its attempts to implement null preemption,
presumably would simply preempt state law and put in place minimal
federal regulation.
The argument that null preemption is simply the limiting case of
state law preemption combined with very low level federal regulation
overlooks the important effects of having regulation "on the books"
even if the level of regulation is exceedingly low. The mere existence
of regulation-even if now at a low level and indeed even if it merely
requires registration of certain actors-often anticipates additional
regulation in the future.129 It puts the issue on the legislature's and
126 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
128 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
The preemption of New York State's airline passenger "bill of rights" is another
example of executive branch null preemption. See supra text accompanying notes
97-103.
129 See Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1380-82
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasizing distinction between minimal permitting program and
full-fledged exemption advanced by the EPA).
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regulators' radar screens. And, even merely ministerial requirements
can be expensive and time consuming. 13 0 Note that none of this is to
say that either null preemption or minimal regulation is preferable
one to the other; it is only to see that they are quite different. If one
strongly favors a laissez-faire approach in a particular setting, then one
should strongly prefer null preemption; if, on the other hand, one
believes that some regulation is appropriate, then null preemption
will be undesirable.
b.

The Preemption Step

Preemption of state law by federal law is justified by the
Supremacy Clause.1 3 1 Commentators often categorize preemption
based upon the scope of the preemption. They have identified "floor
preemption" where the federal government sets a regulatory floor
below which states may not pass but above which states are free to
aspire.' 32 In contrast, "ceiling preemption" or "unitary federal choice
preemption" occurs where the federal government chooses a regulatory level and preempts all state law above, below, or generally inconsistent with,' 3 3 that choice. In some sense, null preemption is a
130 See Grayson P. Hanes & J. Randall Minchew, On Vested Rights to Land Use and
Development, 46 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 373, 381 (1989) (noting that compliance with
"certain specific and published ordinances and regulations" to obtain "ministerial
approvals ... is often expensive and time consuming").
131 See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2. As I discuss below, the dormant Commerce Clause
is an avenue through which state law is preempted even without congressional or
regulatory action. See infra text accompanying notes 152-153. For explication, and
criticism, of existing preemption doctrine, see generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86
VA. L. REv. 225, 290-303 (2000).
132 See Buzbee, supra note 2, at 147-48.
133 It is possible for the federal government to leave intact state law requirements
that are consistent with, and may enhance, existing federal standards. See Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 494-97 (1996) (holding that certain state common law
actions were not preempted since they simply "provide[d] another reason for manufacturers to comply with identical existing 'requirements' under federal law" where
federal statute only preempted state law that created requirements "'different from,
or in addition to,'" federal requirements (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006))); see
also Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 447-48 (2005) (quoting Medtronic
and holding to the same effect). On the importance of interaction between regulatory regimes and the common law where both coexist, see generally Thomas 0.
McGarity, The Regulation-Common Law Feedback Loop in Nonpreemptive Regimes, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 118, at 235.
While null preemption is a type of unitary federal choice, a similar possibility of
preserving consistent state regulatory law does not exist-no affirmative state regulation could be consistent with a federal choice not to regulate.
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variant of unitary federal choice preemption-with the federal choice
being a regulatory vacuum.
Let us now focus on the type of preemption that the preemption
step of null preemption effects. Under currently dominant preemption doctrine, preemption may occur either by explicit direction of
Congress (or, of more recent vintage, a federal department or
agency), or implicitly by virtue of the structure of federal statutory and
regulatory law. Express preemption arises where Congress (or a federal department or agency) announces that state law is preempted to
a defined extent.1 3 4
Courts and commentators have identified two types of implicit
preemption, that is, settings in which courts will find state law preempted even though there is no explicit statement of preemption:
conflict preemption and field preemption.1 35 Under conflict preemption, preemption occurs "when it is impossible to comply with both
state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."s1 No direct conflict is required for a conclusion of field preemption; rather, the logic is that the federal government has, through
extensive regulation, seen fit so completely to "occupy a given field"
that any and all state regulation is deemed preempted.1 3 7
Is it possible to have null preemption where the preemption is
implied? A moment's reflection reveals that it is essentially, if not
entirely, impossible to have field preemption as a component of null
134 See Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and the Second
Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 62 FoRDHAM L. REV.
469, 529-30 (1993).
135 Id.
136 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (citations omitted).
137 Id. Some commentators assert that courts have interpreted some statutes to
effect preemption even though the statutes do not include express preemption provisions and where the requirements of implied preemption would not be met. See, e.g.,
Drummonds, supra note 134, at 555-95 (describing how preemption under the Federal Arbitration Act and federal labor law as interpreted by the courts does not conform to the standard preemption jurisprudential model). In contrast, Professor
Archibald Cox advanced the argument that state law preemption under the NLRA
rests at least in part on congressional intent:
An appreciation of the true character of the national labor policy expressed
in the NLRA and LMRA indicates that in providing a legal framework for
union organization, collective bargaining, and the conduct of labor disputes,
Congress struck a balance of protection, prohibition, and laissez faire in
respect to union organization, collective bargaining, and labor disputes that
would be upset if a state could also enforce statutes or rules of decision resting upon its views concerning accommodation of the same interests.
Archibald Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1337, 1352 (1972).
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preemption. On one hand, field preemption seems to provide an
example of null preemption achieved through implicit preemption: It
knocks out state laws within the entire field, even those that are not
directly covered by the governing federal regulation. In effect, such
state laws are preempted without being directly replaced by a similar
federal regulation. This resemblance to null preemption is limited,
however: The very existence of field preemption turns on there being
substantial federal regulation of the field. Viewed more globally,
therefore, the preemption is accomplished via the imposition of massive federal regulation, which can hardly be described as the absence
of a federal standard.13 8
138 Viewed another way, one might say that field preemption provides local examples of what we might call "quasi-null preemption" within the global context of nonnull preemption: while what Congress and the courts view as "occupying the field"
cannot technically be null preemption, it still resembles null preemption with respect
to the narrow point of which a state wishes to regulate but cannot.
These different possible ways to conceive of how preemption arises highlight the
importance of "framing" for identifying and distinguishing settings of null preemption. (I am grateful to Glynn Lunney for emphasizing to me the potential import of
framing in this context.) As Professor Daryl Levinson has explained, legal analysis
greatly turns upon how the relevant transaction is framed. See DarylJ. Levinson, Framing Transactions in ConstitutionalLaw, 111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1332-75 (2002) (discussing
the importance of how transactions are framed for constitutional analysis). While
private law transactions tend to be readily ascertainable and relatively free from dispute, the same cannot be said of transactions in the public law setting. Professor
Levinson has argued that the relevant frame for constitutional purposes should derive
from the purpose of the constitutional provision at issue. See id. at 1375-90.
A similar approach is appropriately used to identify settings of null preemption.
First, an instrumental approach is true to the concern of null preemption of regulatory voids. Second, such an approach accords with the Supreme Court's analysis in
cases that raise issues tantamount to null preemption. In Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine,
537 U.S. 51 (2002), the Court considered preemption of state law under the Federal
Boat Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (2006). There, Congress authorized the
Coast Guard to issue boat safety regulations and also directed that, to the extent that
the Coast Guard had in fact issued regulations, state law "that is not identical to a
regulation" be preempted. Id. § 4306. (The Act otherwise directed, under a saving
clause, that any state law be preserved. See id. § 4311(g).) The issue in Sprietsma was
whether state law governing propeller guards was preempted. Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at
54. The Coast Guard had considered promulgating regulations on the subject, but
ultimately decided not to. Id. at 60-62. The respondents asked the Court to hold
that the totality of Coast Guard safety regulations, combined with the Guard's decision not to regulate propeller guards, should preempt state law on the subject. Id. at
64. Rejecting this argument, the Court reasoned that state law was not preempted by
the Coast Guard's decision not to regulate propeller guards. See id. at 64-68. The
Court also reasoned that the Coast Guard's decision to promulgate numerous other
regulations related to boat safety did not preempt state law on propeller guards since
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the Coast Guard had left unregulated the separate risk posed by unprotected propellers. See id. at 68-70.
The instrumental approach is also consistent with the Court's decision in Goldstein v. California,412 U.S. 546 (1973), that states could enforce laws criminalizing the
piracy of sound recordings, even though Congress had affirmatively declined to
afford copyright protection to sound recordings. Id. at 571. The Court rejected the
argument that the then-extant copyright statute "occupied the field" of all writings of
which Congress wished to allow protection, and accordingly that any state laws purporting to confer such protection should be preempted. See id. at 563-70. (I am
grateful to Glynn Lunney for this reference.)
The proper frame helps greatly to clarify where null preemption arises and
where it does not. For example, the government might be said to have occupied the
field of air pollutant regulation under the extant CAA. If that is so, then, to the
extent that states were preempted from regulating tailpipe greenhouse-gas emissions,
it would be due to field preemption, not null preemption. Put another way, do greenhouse-gas emissions constitute their own field (that Congress has to date not chosen
to regulate), or is the appropriate frame the field of all air pollutants, which Congress
has occupied through the extant CAA?
Because null preemption is properly concerned with regulatory voids mandated
by the federal government, the appropriate frame must be whether there is a regulatory risk that remains unaddressed. On this understanding, greenhouse gases pose a
risk independent from the risk posed by other air pollutants. Accordingly, the extant
CAA should not be seen to occupy the field of air pollution regulation. (An exception might arise to the extent that regulation of pollutants might be said to have, as a
byproduct, an effect as well on greenhouse-gas emissions, such that regulation of
greenhouse gases might be said to be duplicative. Cf Jonathan Remy Nash, Too Much
Market? Conflict Between TradablePollution Allowances and the "PolluterPays" Principle,24
HARv. ENvTL. L. REv. 465, 511-15 (2000) (describing phenomenon of "indirect regulation," where regulation of one pollutant has a regulatory effect on emissions of
another pollutant).) This conclusion is entirely consistent with the arguments and
decision in Massachusetts. Though the case did not directly raise a question of state
law preemption, the government did not argue that the CAA should be construed to
be the congressional final word on air pollution regulation, and, because the Act does
not directly regulate greenhouse gases, the EPA lacked power to regulate greenhouse
gases. Rather, it argued that greenhouse-gas regulation was inimicalto the CAA. This
view was shared by Justice Scalia in dissent. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
551-52 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, the government pointed to Congress's
limited foray into greenhouse-gas regulation in other statutes, and its consideration
and ultimately rejection of larger statutory treatments of the problem. See id. at
507-08, 529-30 (majority opinion).
Consider next whether null preemption arises where the federal government
offers a law or regulation, while preempting state law that it believes are duplicative of
federal law. Viewed instrumentally, the answer depends on the eye of the beholder.
To the extent that the federal government honestly believes state law to be duplicative, the regulatory risk at issue is addressed and there is no regulatory void. On the
other hand, to the extent that the state takes issue with that assessment-or, indeed,
the federal government has disingenuously used a claim of duplication to make preemption more palatable-then there is null preemption. In the next section, I dis-
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The distinction between typical field preemption and null preemption is exemplified by a recent application of Machinists preemption.13 9 In its recent decision in Chamber of Commerce v. Brown,140 the
Supreme Court concluded that federal labor law preempted a California law that prohibited private employers receiving state program
funds from using those funds to assist, promote, or deter union
organizing. The Court emphasized that the state statute was inconsistent with Congress's intent to construct "a zone free from all regulations, whether state or federal."' 1 41 The Court then explained:
Had Congress enacted a federal version of [the state statute at
issue] that applied analogous spending restrictions to all federal
grants or expenditures, the pre-emption question would be closer.
But none of the cited statutes is Government-wide in scope, none
contains comparable remedial provisions, and none contains
express pro-union exemptions.' 4 2
Put another way, then, while under field preemption it is the decision
of Congress to promulgate so many laws that results in a conclusion
that state law is displaced, in Brown, in contrast, it was the absence of
federal law that led the Court to conclude that state law was displaced.
Consider now whether null preemption can have as a component
implied conflict preemption, where courts find state law preempted
because its application conflicts with a federal statute or federal regulation. Under null preemption, the unitary federal choice is not to
regulate at all. To the extent that this unitary federal choice manifests
cuss "duplicative-regulation null preemption" as part of the taxonomy of settings of
null preemption. See infra text accompanying notes 170-75.
A final question is whether null preemption necessarily arises where federal law
protects against a particular regulatory risk but fails to do so by recognizing a private
right of action. The instrumental approach directs that this question be answered in
the negative. To the extent that existing federal law addresses the regulatory risk,
then there is no regulatory void. By the same token, however, there may be settings
where private rights of action-such as state law tort claims- do address separate regulatory risks. See Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 65 ("[A] Coast Guard decision not to regulate a
particular aspect of boating safety is fully consistent with an intent to preserve state
regulatory authority . . . ."); Barry Meier, Life, Death and Liability, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20,
2009, at BI (discussing congressional momentum to overturn Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr,
518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996), and restore individuals' common law rights to sue defective
medical-device makers). In such settings, the preemption of such causes of action
without any offsetting federal regulation (whether in the form of a federal private
right of action or otherwise) might constitute null preemption.
139 See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
140 128 S. Ct. 2408 (2008).
141 Id. at 2417 (quoting Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders &
Contractors of Mass./R. I., Inc., 507 U.S. 218, 226 (1993)).
142 Id. at 2418 (citation omitted).
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itself simply as a failure to regulate (which, as discussed above, will be
a common setting), then, there will be no express law or regulation
with which state law will conflict.
Though unlikely, it is possible that, in the absence of federal law,
there will be a federal policy goal that state law might impede.
Machinists preemption, where the Court understood Congress to have
preempted state law even though an express assertion of preemption
was absent,1 4 3 may be one such circumstance, although some have
argued that it is difficult to square the Court's reasoning in Machinists
with traditional preemption jurisprudence. 144
It is also possible for regulatory inaction to beget implied conflict
null preemption. The Supreme Court in Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York
State Labor Relations Board 4 5 explained that the failure of an administrative agency to promulgate a regulation should be interpreted to
preempt state law "where failure of the federal officials affirmatively to
exercise their full authority takes on the character of a ruling that no
such regulation is appropriate or approved pursuant to the policy of
the statute."146 The Bethlehem Steel Court proceeded to conclude that
the National Labor Relation Board's decision (in effect at the time)
not to allow foremen to unionize indeed preempted New York State's
own labor board from allowing such relief.147 In other settings, however, the Court has concluded that an administrative decision not to
regulate does not preempt state law that regulates the area that the
federal government declined to regulate. For example, in Sprietsma v.
Mercury Marine,'4 8 the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the
Coast Guard's decision not to issue federal regulations governing boat
propeller guards did not preempt state law on the subject.149 The
Court rested its conclusion on the ground that, in so ruling, the Coast
Guard did not decide that, "as a matter of policy, the States and their
political subdivisions should not impose some version of propeller
guard regulation,"1 5 0 but only concluded that, at the time, there was
no universally acceptable propeller guard for all modes of boat operation that it believed it appropriate to mandate. 1 5'
143 See supra text accompanying notes 81-82.
144 See supra note 137.
145 330 U.S. 767 (1947).
146 Id. at 774.
147 See id. at 774-77.
148 537 U.S. 51 (2002).
149 Id. at 64.
150 Id. at 67.
151 See id; see also Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375,
384 (1983) (finding that, although "a federal decision to forgo regulation in a given
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A comparison between null preemption and its constitutional
analog, dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, further confirms
that null preemption will rarely be achieved without explicit preemption. Dormant Commerce Clause preemption requires no explicit
congressional or agency invocation.15 2 However, while the dormant
Commerce Clause is self-executing, other forms of preemption are
not. Indeed, to the contrary, the Supreme Court has long recognized-and continues to recognize-a presumption against
preemption.15 3
Thus understood, null preemption stands ordinary preemption
on end. Under ordinary conceptions of preemption, there is an
express federal standard while the preemption itself may be express or
implied. With null preemption, by contrast, the preemption will
always be expressl 54 while the federal standard will often, if not almost
always, be unstated. Table 3 summarizes the similarities and differences among different types of preemption, and highlights these
points.
area may imply an authoritative federal determination that the area is best left unregulated, and in that event would have as much pre-emptive force as a decision to regulate[,] ... nothing in the language, history, or policy of the [federal statute at issue]
suggest[ed] such a conclusion" (citations omitted)).
152 See supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
153 For recent statements, see Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194-95 (2009);
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008); Bates v. Dow AgroSciences
LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
Legal scholars have been less convinced of the continuing vitality of the presumption.
See, e.g., Mary J. Davis, The 'New' Presumption Against Preemption, 61 HASTINGS L.J.
(forthcoming 2010) (arguing that in practice, the Supreme Court applies presumption against preemption with varying rigidity, depending upon the setting); Roderick
M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption:How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 61 (2007) ("The Court has vacillated about whether to adopt
a clear statement rule against preemption."). For additional examples, see Alexandra
B. Klass, State Innovation and Preemption: Lessonsfrom State Climate Change Efforts, 41 Lov.
L.A. L. REV. 1653, 1658-72 (2008). For a critique of the "empty formalism" of current
preemption doctrine, including the presumption against preemption, see Thomas W.
Merrill, Preemption in EnvironmentalLaw: Formalism,Federalism Theory, andDefault Rules,
in FEDERAL PREEMPTION, supra note 12, at 166, 166-172. For a normative argument
that the presumption be applied only in particular circumstances, see Stephen F. Williams, Preemption:First Principles, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 323, 327-31 (2009).
154 Here, I refer to "express preemption" expansively to include state law preemption as interpreted by the Court under a preemption standard that is different from
the traditional standard. See supra note 137. Along similar lines, Professor Glicksman
argues that courts ought to be reticent to find preemption by inaction absent express
congressional preemption of state law. See Robert L. Glicksman, FederalPreemption by
Inaction, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra note 118, at 167, 178-83.
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COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF PREEMPTION

the preemption
Type of Preemption Is constitutional?
Typical Express
Preemption

No

Is the preemption

Federal standard?

Express

Yes

express or implied?

Yes

Implied Conflict
Preemption
Implied Field
Preemption

No

Implied

Massive, but not
directly on point

Null Preemption

No

Express, in most
cases

No

Dormant
Commerce Clause

Yes

Implied

No

C.

Typology of Null Preemption

In this section, I elucidate several paradigmatic settings in which
null preemption may arise: intentional null preemption, regulatorydelay null preemption, regulatory-preemptive-mismatch null preemption, and duplicative regulation null preemption. I also offer some
preliminary thoughts on the extent to which the applicable setting
may shed light on the normative desirability of null preemption. I
return to the normative question in greater detail in the succeeding
Part.
1. Intentional Null Preemption
Intentional null preemption arises when the federal government
affirmatively decides both to preempt state law and to establish a zero
level of federal regulation. In other words, it arises when the federal
government decides to ensconce a regulatory void.
Intentional null preemption may arise in two ways. First, Congress may affirmatively decide both to preempt state law and to bar
federal regulation in an area. It is also possible for Congress to preempt state law and to have the executive branch actor to which Congress delegated the decision whether to promulgate federal regulation
choose not to regulate. Given the Supreme Court's statement that it
vindicates congressional intent to create a zone free of federal and
state regulation, Machinists preemption is an example of intentional
null preemption.1 5 5
155 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text. Another possible example of
intentional null preemption is found in the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000 (CFMA), Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 app. E (codified as amended in
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The forms of null preemption to which we now turn differ from
intentional null preemption in that they are settings where the null
preemption arises accidentally or incidentally. As we shall see, however, these forms of null preemption may elide into intentional null
preemption, depending upon the attendant circumstances or upon
one's point of view.
2.

Regulatory-Delay Null Preemption

Regulatory-delay null preemption may arise where Congress
leaves it to an executive branch actor to promulgate federal regulation
as it sees fit, and the absence of federal regulation may simply be the
result of delay in promulgating regulation.1 5 6 A federal department
or agency may decide to issue a finding that no regulation in an area
is appropriate, perhaps in response to an administrative petition for
rulemaking. Often, however, the federal department or agency will
simply decide not to regulate without formalizing that position.15 7 In
short, then, the decision not to regulate will often manifest itself simply as an absence of federal law or regulation. The fate of New York
scattered sections of 7, 8, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.). There, Congress precluded the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission and the SEC from regulating individually
negotiated swap agreements, and also prohibited states from regulated certain "covered swap agreements" under gaming and bucket shop laws. See id. § 105, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1188 (2006). Uncertainty remains, however, as to whether other state regulatory
regimes might remain applicable and available. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG
Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 943, 983-89 (2009) (noting that there was an open
question as to whether states could use insurance law to regulate credit default swaps,
though no state elected to do so). (I am grateful to Onnig Dombalagian andJennifer
Johnson for directing me to this example.)
156 It is possible, of course, for Congress to preempt state law in an area and then
to consider subsequent regulatory legislation at various points in the future that
might reduce the scope of the null preemption. Indeed, Congress has considered
over the years, though never enacted, federal legislation that would have created a
federal airline passenger bill of rights. See, e.g., Bailey, supra note 98 (noting, in the
wake of the JetBlue incident in New York in 2008, that Senator Boxer was "planning"
to sponsor federal legislation); Sharkey, supra note 98 (describing how an American
Airlines episode in Dallas-Fort Worth had motivated a passenger to push for a federal
air passenger bill of rights, and also noting episodes from earlier years that had
prompted other, ultimately doomed efforts to enact legislation).
Still, the notion of Congress enacting legislation with perhaps some legislators
having a vague intent to revisit the area in the future differs from an executive branch
actor setting priorities and developing a regulatory agenda. It is for this reason that I
conclude that regulatory-delay null preemption is properly considered a subset of
executive branch null preemption.
157 See supra text accompanying notes 99-103.

2010]

NULL PREEMPTION

1049

State's airline passenger "bill of rights" 5 8 provides an example of regulatory-delay null preemption. 5 9 More generally, agencies may
(often quite predictably) take a slower approach to regulation than
will states, and sometimes may never promulgate regulations.16 0
If regulatory delay is truly the-source of the null preemption, one
can expect the federal government to regulate-and therefore the
null preemption to dissipate-within some reasonable period of
time. 16 1 One such example would be the efforts by states, and by the
federal government, to promulgate an airline passengers' "bill of
rights." 162 On the other hand, it is possible that regulatory delay may
extend far beyond congressional intent. Even beyond that, it may be
that the executive branch actor uses regulatory-delay as an excuse
when in fact the actor never intends to regulate. These situations of
"regulatory inaction null preemption" are more intentional, and more
problematic. Consider, for example, the EPA's argument that itjustifiably could decline to exercise any existing authority it had to regulate tailpipe greenhouse-gas emissions; the EPA's standing argument
was intended further to shield the EPA's affirmative decision not to
act.163 Even more egregious on this account is the EPA's continued
failure to regulate motor vehicle tailpipe greenhouse-gas emissions
even in the wake of the Court's Massachusetts v. EPA decision.16 4

158
159

See supra text accompanying notes 97-103.
See supra note 103 (noting that Department of Transportation has only very

recently taken steps to regulate in the area).

160

Professor Christopher Schroeder explains:
The ossification of federal rule making makes federal agencies very slowmoving beasts. They are reluctant to revise standards or programs in light of
new knowledge and changed circumstances due to the cumbersome, laborintensive nature of the enterprise, fraught as it is with the hazards of hardlook judicial review. None of the federal agencies that have issued statements of preemption in regulatory preambles, for instance, has been an
active rule maker in recent years, preferring instead to engage in negotiations with the regulated community to persuade "voluntary" recalls or modifications of products or drug labels. In comparison, states and localities are
relatively more nimble.
Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine, in PREEMPTION CHOICE,
supra note 118, at 119, 142.
161 Cf supra text accompanying notes 129-30 (noting the difference between minimal regulation and exemption from regulation).
162 See supra text accompanying notes 97-103.
163 See supra notes 5, 52-59 and accompanying text.
164 See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
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Regulatory-Preemptive-Mismatch Null Preemption

Regulatory-preemptive-mismatch null preemption occurs where
the breadth of preemption of state law as set by Congress unintentionally does not match the scope of federal regulation as established
either by Congress or an executive branch actor, with the mismatch
resulting in null preemption. Though null preemption results, it is
not intentional. Thus, for example, the null preemption of data from
live basketball games that the Second Circuit effectively found in the
Motorola case was intentional,1 6 5 and therefore not a case of regulatory-preemptive-mismatch null preemption.
It is possible to envision settings of intentional null preemption
that may be difficult to distinguish from true, unintentional regulatory-preemptive-mismatch null preemption. It is possible that Congress intentionally sets the scope of preemption more broadly than its
regulation (or than a delegation of regulatory authority). It is also
possible that Congress unintentionally set the scope of preemption
and a regulatory grant non-coextensively, yet an executive branch
actor argues (and seeks judicial deference on the point) that Congress
did so intentionally.
For example, Congress's decision to exempt sophisticated investors from some protections of the securities laws and then also to preempt state law qualification requirements16 6 can be seen as
intentional null preemption. On the other hand, one could argue
that Congress did not realize that null preemption was the combined
effect of these exemptions; in that case, the setting can be seen as an
example of regulatory-preemptive-mismatch null preemption.
Also hard to categorize is the federal government's apparent conception of the null preemption of power to regulate motor vehicle
greenhouse-gas emissions. The EPA seems to have believed that Congress intentionally both preempted state law regulation of motor vehicle greenhouse-gas emissions (subject to obtaining a waiver) and also
disallowed the EPA from regulating in the area (or, equally, chose to
allow the EPA to decide whether so to regulate and EPA declined that
invitation) .167 On the other hand, opponents of the EPA's position
would argue (indeed, did argue, at least in part) that the null preemption was the inadvertent result of a regulatory-preemptive-mismatch.1 68 (In the end, the Supreme Court concluded that Congress
165
166
167
168

See
See
See
See

supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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did empower the EPA to act, and also that the EPA was constrained in
deciding not to act.16 9 )
4.

Duplicative Regulation Null Preemption

Duplicative regulation null preemption occurs when the federal
government decides to preempt state law on the ground that the state
law to be preempted is duplicative of federal law (whether existing
federal law or federal law being enacted at the same time as the preemption). Here, in its pure form, the federal government does not
understand itself to be effecting null preemption-there is federal law
on point, after all. The states (and presumably others in society) do
understand there to be null preemption to the extent that they do not
see the state law to be duplicative of federal law.
Congress's broader decision to preempt state qualification
requirements on the ground that they were duplicative of existing federal securities law regulation1 70 is an example of duplicative regulation null preemption. So, too, is the preemption of state laws under
the national banking laws.' 7 1 (In the latter case, federal regulators
remain free to impose federal regulation.)
Much as unintentional regulatory-delay null preemption can
morph into (or really be) regulatory inaction null preemption, so too

is there a sinister side to duplicative regulation null preemption. The
claim that federal regulation duplicates state regulation such that state
regulation is unnecessary and can be preempted may be a cover to
create an intentional regulatory void.
Some commentators have argued that the effect of leaving purchasers under Rule 506 without the protections of either state or federal law was unintended, and that the preemption of state law should
be repealed. 7 2 With respect to the question of whether NSMIA creates a far broader form of null preemption by precluding all qualification requirements, those who believe that qualification requirements
do work separate from that done by disclosure requirements under
federal law likely understand NSMIA to effect null preemption, and
find it normatively undesirable.1 7 3 Those, in contrast, who derided
state blue-sky merit regulation as duplicative of federal securities regulation, 174 and accordingly laud the NSMIA preemption,1 75 may not
169
170
171
172
173
174

See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 95, at 107-16; Perino, supra note 92, at 318-29.
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see the NSMIA as effecting null preemption in the first instance, and
in any event consider the preemption normatively desirable.
III.

THE NARRow NoRMATIrE CASE FOR NULL PREEMPTION

The previous Part set out the contours of null preemption. In
this Part, I address the question of when null preemption might be
normatively desirable. I first argue that the normative case for null
preemption is generally a narrow one. Second, I consider questions
of institutional choice. While those commentators who find it normatively preferable to have Congress make these preemption decisions in
general clearly will prefer Congress also to make decisions on null
preemption,17 6 I argue that even those who have an institutional preference for an executive branch actor to make preemption decisions
will want those actors to announce the reasons for invoking null preemption. On this basis, all commentators should find normatively
undesirable situations where an executive branch actor seeks to
instantiate null preemption covertly through a "back door."
A.

Evaluating the Normative Value of Null Preemption

Let us begin by looking at one necessary component of null preemption-that the federal government believes that regulation is not
desirable. Under a basic formulation of the standard cost-benefit view
of regulation,' 7 7 one should regulate if the benefits of regulation, BR,
exceed the costs of regulation, CR, i.e., if BR - CR > 0.178 One should
not regulate if that is not the case.
175 See, e.g., Perino, supra note 92, at 331 ("The allocations of governmental
authority made in the NSMIA translate well to allocating authority and control over
the creation and administration of private causes of action.... [I]t makes little sense
to preserve state antifraud causes of action for issuers whose securities trade on
national markets.").
176 See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 4, at 1599-1613 (setting out criteria guiding normatively desirable federal preemption).
177 There may be other normative bases upon which to decide whether to regulate. I do not address them in this Article.
178 One might take the view that error costs (i.e., the possibility that one might
misestimate the benefits, the costs, or both) militate in favor of requiring, before regulation, that the benefits exceed the costs by some significant amount (i.e., only if BR
- CR - E > 0), or, perhaps, regulating even where the costs slightly outweigh the benefits (i.e., where CR - BR < e). These variants all turn on the sign and magnitude of the
term BR - CR that is required to justify regulation. For ease of exposition, I remain in
the text with the basic formulation that calls for BR - CR > 0.
Cost-benefit analysis also calls for choosing among regulatory options the one
that provides the greatest surplus of benefits over costs. I assume, again for ease of
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But is this condition sufficient? It is not, because it speaks only to
whether the federal government itself should regulate, not whether it
should also preempt state law. There are two broad reasons why the
mere fact that the federal government is justified in not regulating
does not also mean that the federal government is justified in preempting state law. First, and of great importance, there are federalism
costs associated with preempting state law, even where the state in
question lacks an objectively valid normative basis for the law that is to
be preempted. Second, beyond this, in some cases, the state government may have a valid normative justification for its law. In such
cases, the state and federal governments may simply disagree as to
what is normatively justified and desirable, in which case the normative hurdle for the federal government to meet in order to preempt
the state law becomes even higher. I address each point in turn.
Let us begin, then, with a setting where state government has not
promulgated a law or regulation for an objectively normatively desirable reason.1 79 For one thing, as courts long have lamented, it is difficult to ascertain when-and perhaps rare to find that-a state is
acting pursuant to purely undesirable motives. 18 0 For example, even
if one can make a convincing case that regulatory interest groups have
captured state government, it is very unlikely that there are no legitimate goals that state regulation seeks to pursue.
Moreover, even if a state acts pursuant to normatively undesirable
motivations, there are costs to federal preemption. Consider first separation of powers' 8 1 and legitimacy costs to state governments. The
exposition, that any regulatory program under consideration already meets this
criterion.
179 It is hardly beyond the pale to include environmental groups within the broad
universe of interest groups who may seek to sway government action under public
choice and political economy theories. Still, one would not expect this particular
circumstance to be commonplace. See Todd J. Zywicki, EnvironmentalExternalities and
Political Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73
TUL. L. REv. 845, 874-88 (1999).
180 Compare C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 402 (1994)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting the legal distinction between on the one hand
"[a] facially nondiscriminatory regulation supported by a legitimate state interest
which incidentally burdens interstate commerce," which "is constitutional unless the
burden on interstate trade is clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits," and on
the other hand "a regulation [that] affirmatively or clearly discriminates against interstate commerce on its face or in practical effect," which "violates the Constitution
unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to protectionism" (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)), with id. ("Of
course, there is no clear line separating these categories.").
181 For discussion in the preemption context, see Verchick & Mendelson, supra
note 118, at 16.
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federal system created by the U.S. Constitution presupposes the legitimacy of states to regulate on a whole host of matters.182 States, it
seems, may enact poor laws and promulgate undesirable regulations
with not inconsiderable frequency.' 8 3 To be sure, the Framers envisioned the Constitution and the federal government to act as a check
on some categories of undesirable state laws.1 84 But were the federal
government to preempt state law every time it deemed the state law to
be-and even when, objectively, state law is-undesirable, then there
would be little left to federalism.1 85
182 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. X; Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of
Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government,
54 COLUM. L. REv. 543, 544 (1954) ("National action has . . . always been regarded as
exceptional in our polity, an intrusion to be justified by some necessity, the special
rather than the ordinary case."). Some may doubt the value of having a federal system (at least for purposes of governing in certain areas), and on this basis may discount the benefits of federalism. For purposes of the calculus here, I accept as
exogenous the choice to maintain a federal system, and therefore take federalism
benefits as a given. Cf Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional
Adjudication, 94 VA. L. REv. 1869, 1916-19 (2008) (noting that the federal structure of
the Constitution suggests that the federalism benefits of having state courts resolve
some cases and issues be taken as a given); Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins,
JudicialFederalism and the Administrative States, 87 CAL. L. REv. 613, 655 (1999) ("Even
though some critics have expressed doubts about the continued need for certain cate-

gories of federal jurisdiction-particularly diversity jurisdiction-they remain a given
whose provision and presumed purposes the judicial branch is obliged to honor."
(footnote omitted)).
183 See Neil Gorsuch & Michael Guzman, Will the Gentlemen Please Yield? A Defense of
the Constitutionality of State-Imposed Term Limitations, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 341, 351
(1991) ("[T]he Framers adopted a compromise, placing primary authority with states,
but empowering the Congress to override undesirable regulations.").
184 Consider, for example, the Commerce Clause, and especially, as interpreted by
the courts, the dormant Commerce Clause. See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
185 Some, perhaps most notably Herbert Wechsler, have argued that the constitutional structure itself protects the interests of states by distributing legislative power
and the power to select the President at least in part on the basis of state boundaries.
See Wechsler, supra note 182, at 546-58; see also Bradford R. Clark, ConstitutionalCompromise and the Supremacy Clause, 83 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1421, 1431-35 (2008) (making a similar argument based on the debates at the Constitutional Convention). On
this account, one can be more sanguine that preemption decisions made by the political branches are appropriate since the interests of the states will have been taken into
account. See Wechsler, supra note 182, at 558-60.
Whatever the merit of this argument, it is weaker in the context of null preemption, as opposed to preemption of state law in favor of a national standard. The interests of states and national government are at least somewhat aligned-aligned, that is,
at least in terms of whether regulation in some form is appropriate-where national
action is being weighed against individual state action (at least to the extent that many
states are undertaking, or would like to undertake, such action). In contrast, null
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The legitimacy costs of null preemption to state governments are
substantial. Federal preemption of state law is inconsistent with the
dignity of states as sovereigns in any circumstance.1 8 6 The offense is of
lesser magnitude where, under the constitutional scheme for allocation of power, the preemption lies in an area in which the federal
government is seen to regulate more effectively or appropriately. In
contrast, the offense to state dignity is surely heightened where the
preemption is null preemption, and the federal government preempts
state power to regulate without offering to do so on its own.'8 7 Null
preemption entirely deprives states of their ability to fulfill their sovereign obligation to protect their citizens. In forming (and subsequently joining) the United States, the sovereign states have
surrendered certain powers to the national government.' 8 8 States
have surrendered at least concurrent regulatory jurisdiction over
some areas and have also conferred to the federal government the
preemption disempowers states and the federal government from regulating where at
least many states believe some regulatory action is appropriate. Indeed, though it is
doubtful that he contemplated the possibility of null preemption, Professor Wechsler
discussed the primacy of state governance as against "[n]ational action," id. at 544,
not as against the absence of any action at all.
186 See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a
Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1011, 1040-41 (2000) ("[B]road notions of state dignity are difficult to square with ... the power of [the federal] sovereign to strip states
of their regulatory authority via federal preemption."). For critical discussion of the
relationship between state dignity and state sovereign immunity jurisprudence, see
Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-DoctrinalPerspective, 89 VA. L. REv. 1,
51-76 (2003).
187 Cf Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2720 (2009) (noting that
"the incursion that the [federal] regulation makes upon traditional state powers
[should not] be minimized").
188 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007) (noting that, "[w]hen a
State enters the Union, it surrenders certain prerogatives"). Other powers are
retained by the states, while yet other powers are potentially exercisable by either the
federal government or the states.
A competing account sees power as emanating directly from the people, with the
Constitution allocating that power among the federal government, state governments,
and the people. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403-04 (1819);
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison). Even on this understanding, one might
think that, to the extent that the federal government alters the initial constitutional
allocation by preempting state law, the states might expect the federal government to
regulate in their stead. Cf McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 404-05 ("The government of the Union ... is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people.... Its
powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their
benefit."). People then have a right to expect that, to the extent that the federal
government precludes the state government from exercising a power that they (the
people) granted to the state government, the federal government will affirmatively
exercise that power in an appropriate fashion.
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right to preempt them from regulating over those areas.18 9 The states
might reasonably expect that, in return for the loss of sovereign prerogative (where the federal government chooses to divest the states of
power to regulate by preemption), the federal government will regulate in their stead.' 9 0 And the regulatory void will (at least in the view
of the states that can neither regulate nor point to federal law that fills
the void) disadvantage their citizens. 19 '
Second, consider the costs resulting from not having multiple
regimes free to regulate in an area. These costs arise generally when
the federal government preempts state law and installs its own system
of regulation;192 the fact that the federal government in addition
chooses not to regulate itself only exacerbates these costs. First, null
preemption foregoes the benefits of having states functions as federal
"laborator[ies]" of experimentation.1 9 3 It will also tend to short-cir189 See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 519.
190 See id. ("When a State enters the Union, it surrenders certain sovereign prerogatives.... These sovereign prerogatives are now lodged in the Federal Government
...

."); cf Anita Bernstein, Implied Reverse Preemption, 74 BROoK. L. REV. 669, 670-71

(2009) (suggesting thatjudicial holdings of implied preemption be subject to reversal
based upon subsequent congressional deregulation of an area).
Not all political structures that feature hierarchical layers of governments make
similar assumptions about the allocation of powers. Only for those that do will the
analysis here apply. See infra text accompanying notes 275-78.
191 Cf Williams, supra note 153, at 333 (admitting that application of the presumption against preemption only in some circumstances would alter the balance of
federal and state power, but arguing that it would do so in order to ameliorate "the
risk that state action may impose costs on the welfare of citizens of other states").
Here, the argument is that null preemption impairs the citizens of states that are
unable to regulate. It bears emphasis that greater regulation need not be the result:
State regulation may function to enhance, rather than restrict, people's rights. See
supra note 12.
192 See Robert A. Schapiro, FromDualism to Polyphony, in PREEMPTION CHOICE, supra
note 118, at 33, 43-44 (discussing the values of a new conception of the relationship
of the states and the federal government).
193 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see Schapiro, supra note 192, at 43. It is on this basis that commentators faced
with a related but distinct question-whether, where federal preemption of state law
is justified, it should take the form of setting a federal regulatory floor or a unitary
federal choice-argue that the presumption should be the setting of a federal floor,
because that option preserves greater state regulatory authority. See, e.g., Buzbee,
supra note 4, at 1574, 1603-13. Professor Buzbee has set out several criteria that
should guide us in determining whether federal preemption is normatively desirable
(and, if so, whether that preemption should take the form of floor or ceiling preemption). Put succinctly, he argues that preemption is more likely to be justified where
(1) the regulatory object is a product, as opposed to a location-specific risk; (2) there
is the need for large-scale research and thus benefits to be gained from research pooling, as opposed to the need for context-intensive research; (3) the scale of the prob-
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cuit the evolution and spread of regulatory ideas. 1 9 4 Even if a particular area is normatively better left unregulated, still there may be lost
the benefit of having states engage in new forms of regulation.' 9 5 Second, an absence of regulation forecloses a dialogue among jurisdictions-and ultimately among their constituents-as to the desirability
and appropriate form of regulation.19 6 It also interferes with the
notion that law allows for citizens to express certain values.197 Null
preemption cuts interjurisdictional dialogue off completely, and also
stifles the expressive value of law. Third, preemption of state law in
favor of a federal standard reduces the benefits that flow from "redundancy" of having multiple regulatory systems; another regulatory system reduces the possibility that certain undesirable behavior slips
through the cracks.' 98 Null preemption ensures that there will be no
regulation, thus exacerbating the problem even more.
lem is national, as opposed to local; and (4) the problem raises the potential for
overregulation by virtue of multiple responses, as opposed to the potential for governments to be overly burdened by inertia and/or capture in responding to the problem
(all of which argues in favor of multiple regulatory pathways). See id. at 1612 fig.1.
Reflection confirms that these considerations do not (standing alone, at least)
help us to resolve the normative question of null preemption. Professor Buzbee's
criteria were developed, and seem most applicable, where the question of whether to
regulate has already been answered affirmatively, and the only question remaining is
which level of government is better suited to undertake the regulatory role. In settings in which null preemption is on the table, by contrast, the federal government is
proposing not only to preempt all state law, but also to provide no regulation itself.
194 There are different methods of policy diffusion, some of which are preferable
to others. See Charles R. Shipan & Craig Volden, The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion, 52
AM.J. POL. Sci. 840, 841-44 (2008) (distinguishing among learning, competition, imitation, and coercion as different methods of policy diffusion of varying valence). In
particular settings, it may be that undesirable forms of policy diffusion-such as competition-may dominate, in which case the losses from preemption may be lower.
Further, some policy diffusion instruments require longer time horizons; for them, an
extended period of experimentation free of preemption may be required.
195 These costs may be substantial, but also hard to predict, given the often pathdependent nature of the evolution of law.
196 See Schapiro, supra note 192, at 43-44 (discussing how different regulators can
learn from each other). Professors Galle and Seidenfeld, Metzger, and Sharkey argue
that administrative law requirements may preserve this interjurisdictional dialogue,
albeit in the context of federal rulemaking. See infra notes 224-26 and accompanying
text.
197 See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, When Courts Speak: Social Capitaland Law's Expressive
Function, 49 SYRAcUsE L. REv. 1039, 1039-41 (1999) (asserting that "[bly performing
an expressive function, courts often serve as a unique site for public discourse").
198 See Schapiro, supra note 192, at 44 (discussing how an alternative set of regulators can provide an alternative avenue for relief).
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Putting the foregoing in the nomenclatures of benefits and costs,
even if the federal government is confident that BR < CR, the federalism benefits that having the federal government preempt state law
would sacrifice, BF, may be large enough to change the calculus.. The
state regulation will nonetheless be justified in surviving if BR + BF > CR.
We have just seen that federal preemption of state law may not be
justified even where the state government lacks a normatively desirable justification for promulgating the law in question. There is even
less justification for federal preemption where, as is often the case, the
state has arguable normative justifications.
Consider first that the federal and state governments may measure the relevant benefits and costs differently, and thus reach different conclusions about the normative desirability of regulation. In
addition to being normatively justified in choosing not to regulate
itself, the federal government must be normatively justified in preempting state law.
One setting in which the federal and state governments may measure benefits and costs differently is where global and local benefits
and costs differ. A state government may believe itselfjustified in regulating if the local benefits of regulation, BR, exceed the local costs
thereof, CR, i.e., if BR > CR. Here the federal government may be
justified in preempting state law if the state regulation would impose
externalized costs on those in other states. Since the state is not taking into account those externalized "federalism costs," C,, it may well
be that BR < CR + CF, in which case federal preemption might be
justified.1 99
It is difficult to identify other settings where differences in the
way that federal and state governments measure benefits and costs are
sufficient to justify null preemption. Consider first a setting where
there is disagreement as to whether to consider psychic benefits of
regulation, Bp Some commentators have argued that risk regulation
should largely be left to experts who can assess objectively the threats
posed by various risks. 2 0 0 In contrast, others have argued that govern199 See, e.g, Jonathan Remy Nash, Environmental Superliens and the Problem of Mortgage-Backed Securitization, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 127, 178-79 (2002) (discussing an
example of such an externality); Jonathan Remy Nash, The Illusion of Devolution in
Environmental Law, 38 URB. LAw. 1003, 1005-06 (2006) [hereinafter Nash, The Illusion
of Devolution].
200 See generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRcLE 59-61 (1993) (calling for creation of health and environmental administrative overseer that would deal

with risk regulation uniformly and rationally); James T. Hamilton & W. Kip Viscusi,
The Magnitude and Policy Implications of Health Risks from Hazardous Waste Sites, in ANALYZING SUPERFUND 55, 76-80 (Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995) (crit-
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ment responsibly should respond to things that the public perceives to
pose risks, even if in reality they do not (or if they pose less of a risk
than they are generally perceived to), i.e., that it is appropriate to regulate where BR+ BRP> CR even if BR < CR. 20 1 Even if the federal government is convinced that a product or activity does not objectively pose a
risk, should it preempt a state government from regulating that product or activity?2 02
Federal and state governments also may objectively assess the scientific evidence differently, leading them to value the benefits and
costs differently. 203 As an example, the federal government seems to
icizing risk assessment under CERCIA statute as sometimes too stringent, in part as
response to public perceptions of risks of hazardous waste sites); Cass R. Sunstein, The
Laws of Fear, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1119, 1163-68 (2002) (reviewing PAUL SLOvic, THE
PERCEPTION OF RIsK (2000)) (using Slovic's empirical research on how people and
experts think about risk to craft a policy analysis).
201 For discussion, see, for example, Howard F. Chang, Risk Regulation, Endogenous
Public Concerns, and the Hormones Dispute: Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself, 77 S. CAL. L.
REv. 743, 761 (2004) (identifying as especially problematic the scenario where industry seeks to exploit and expand public fears in order to obtain beneficial regulatory
regime); Douglas A. Kysar, Preferencesfor Processes: The Process/ProductDistinctionand the
Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARv. L. REv. 526, 579-80 (2004) (arguing in favor
of a role for consumer preferences in developing regulatory policy); Cass R. Sunstein,
Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 94-105 (2002)
(explaining that individuals often fall prey to both over- and underestimating
probabilities, and that it is undesirable, and often illegal, for administrative actors to
act based upon such reactions).
202 For example, effective July 1, 2008, a New York State health law severely limits
the circumstances under which physicians may administer flu vaccines with more than
trace amounts of mercury to pregnant women. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2112
(McKinney Supp. 2009). The Centers for Disease Control indicates that such vaccines
are "safe" for pregnant women. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Q&A:
Thimerosal in Seasonal Influenza Vaccines, http://www.cdc.gov/Flu/about/qa/thimerosal.htm (last visitedJan. 28, 2010) (answering "yes" to the question, "Is it safe for
pregnant women to receive an influenza vaccine that contains thimerosal [a mercurybased preservative]?" and noting that "the benefits of influenza vaccine with reduced
or standard thimerosal content outweighs the theoretical risk, if any, of thimerosal").
Another provision of the law, captioned "Statement of legislative findings and intent,"
makes clear that the legislature acted in response not to actual risk, but rather to
public concern and fear: "It is the intent of the legislature to minimize public fear and
to increase public confidence in the safety of New York's vaccine supply by explicitly
limiting the mercury content of vaccines where substitutes are available." 2005 N.Y.
Laws 3379, 3379. See also Chang, supra note 201, at 750-58 (discussing this question
in the context of the European Union's ban on the import of beef treated with
growth hormones and the United States WTO challenge of the ban).
203 In Natural Res. Def Council, Inc. v. EPA, 16 F.3d 1395 (4th Cir. 1993), the federal government deferred to state reliance on scientific studies that, contrary to the
then-current official federal position, allowed for less restrictive regulation. The case
concerned the choice by states, subject to EPA approval, of safe levels of dioxin in
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have taken the scientific evidence of global warming less seriously
than, say, the State of California. 204 If the state assessment of the relevant science renders the benefits of regulation BR much larger than
the benefits that the federal government's science assessment, BR,
then it is possible that the state will consider regulation justified since
BRL > CR, while the federal government will not if BR < CR. Even if the
federal government is convinced that greenhouse-gas emissions do
not pose a real threat, 205 should it preempt California from acting on
its belief that they do?
Next, federal and state governments may rely upon the precautionary principle to varying degrees, and under different interpretations, or not at all. The precautionary principle is a principle that
provides normative guidance as to whether and when to regulate. 206
In its essential form, it holds that scientific uncertainty as to a risk is
not a sufficient basis to refuse to regulate, at least where the risk that
may be posed is substantial.2 0 7 Thus, for example, if the United States
and a state-say California-both find equally uncertain the scientific
support for greenhouse-gas emissions causing global warming, yet California subscribes to the precautionary principle in this context20 8
while the United States does not (or subscribes more strongly or to a
water bodies. Id. at 1398-99. Though the EPA had officially endorsed certain scientific studies, Maryland and Virginia chose to rely on scientific studies that found
greater levels of dioxin were acceptable. Interestingly, the EPA chose to approve of
Maryland and Virginia's action, leaving it to private litigants to raise a challenge. Id.
In the end, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled it proper
to defer to the EPA's decision. Id. at 1402-06.
204 For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 42-55, 58-60 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs.
The United States and China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters,55 UCLA L. REv. 1675, 1691, 1694-95 (2008) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Complex Climate Change Incentives].
205 For an argument that the Supreme Court has recently-including in the Massachusetts v. EPA case-come to doubt administrative agencies' assertions of alleged
expertise because of increased politicization, see Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule,
Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 Sup. CT. REV. 51, 64-92. Professors Freeman and Vermeule's argument casts even more normative doubt on administrative assertions of null preemption.
206 See Nash, supra note 16, at 498 ("The precautionary principle is a normative
principle of environmental law.").
207 See id.
208 Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic: Global Warming, Terrorism, and
OtherProblems,23 PACE ENvrt. L. REv. 3, 3-4 (2005) (discussing how the United States
varies its adherence to the precautionary principle depending upon context); Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and Climate Change, 107
COLUM. L. REv. 503, 515-16 (2007) (same); Jonathan B. Wiener, Whose PrecautionAfter
All? A Comment on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DuKE J.
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stronger interpretation of the principle 209 than does the Untied
States), then California may find it normatively appropriate to regulate while the United States will not. In effect, the state government
may include benefits in its calculation that the federal government
will not, so that, as above, Bp > CR, thus justifying local regulation,
while BR < CR. Should the United States also preempt California's regulation based on its views on the precautionary principle?
Consider, finally, the possibility that different valuations or
approaches to foreign affairs may cause the federal and state governments to value the benefits and costs of regulation differently. 21 0 In
particular, there may be benefits to be gained from regulation and the
benefits might outweigh the costs domestically, but one might think
that those benefits would be dwarfed by the greater benefits that
might result were the United States to hold off on such regulation in
order to induce other countries to act accordingly and/or to extract
other foreign-relations benefits. Indeed, this was the type of argument used to support foreign policy preemption of state tailpipe emission regulation and also by the EPA in support of its decision to
decline to regulate motor vehicle greenhouse-gas emissions. 2 11 A
state, by comparison, might take a different view either as to the
importance of the short-term local benefits of regulation in such circumstances, or of the appropriateness or likely success of holding out
on domestic regulation in order to induce action by foreign countries.2 12 Letting C, represent the international relation costs of regulation, it is possible that the federal government will not want to
regulate since BR < CR+ C1, while the local government will consider
only that BR> CR. Once again, the question arises whether the federal
government is justified in preempting state regulation in this
setting. 213
COMP. & INT'L L. 207, 225-43 (2003) (comparing evaluations of the level of risk
posed by certain policy problems in the United States and Europe).
209 See Nash, supra note 16, at 500-01 (discussing varying interpretations of the
principle).
210 Cf Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 427 (2003) ("California seeks to
use an iron fist where the President has consistently chosen kid gloves.").
211 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 513-14 (2007) ("According to EPA, unilateral EPA regulation of motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions might also hamper
the President's ability to persuade key developing countries to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.").
212 See Sunstein, Complex Climate Change Incentives, supra note 204, at 1694-95
(describing and analyzing California's willingness to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions even in the absence of commitment that other countries would do the same).
213 See Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L.
REv. 1621, 1628-37 (2008) (characterizing certain California public policy initiatives
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The foregoing makes clear that it is difficult to make a clear normative case for federal preemption of state regulation in favor of no
regulation at all where state normative goals and practices may differ
from the federal ones. This is even more the case where the state
regulation would not externalize costs on other states or on the federal government.
What does this narrow normative picture mean for the various
paradigmatic settings of null preemption?2 1 4 On the understanding
that the answer to this question is to simply take the view that the
normative desirability of the outcome is determinative, 2 15 regulatory
inaction null preemption is normatively justified if null preemption is
warranted, notwithstanding the fact that Congress did not intend null
preemption to inhere. Intentional null preemption should be judged
based upon the justifications for introducing null preemption.
Regulatory-delay null preemption would be justified to the extent
that (1) federal regulation, which would be normatively desirable, is
forthcoming within some reasonable period of time, and (2) in the
interim an absence of regulation is preferable to leaving states free to
continue to regulate (for example, if state regulation would impose
interstate externalities). Regulatory inaction null preemption would
be normatively justified only to the extent that permanent null preemption is normatively appropriate.
Duplicative regulation null preemption will be normatively justified under this approach only if two conditions are met. First, it presumably must be the case that the state laws to be preempted are in
fact duplicative of federal law. Second, it must be that allowing state
regulation would be normatively undesirable-for example, if it
would impose interstate externalities. Put another way, the mere fact
that state law duplicates federal law should not be enough to justify
preemption. States should be free to exercise their sovereign prerogative to echo federal law (or to allow federal law to echo their law).
as those more typical of a nation state than of a state in a federal union); id. at
1637-51 (arguing that the "bargaining chip" justification for foreign affairs preemption has held sway in particular circumstances); Judith Resnik, supra note 113, at
74-78 (arguing that foreign affairs preemption lacks a clear constitutional basis, and
that the rise of translocal networks argues against federal preemption of state and
local initiatives that may affect foreign relations); Note, Foreign Affairs Preemption and
State Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1877, 1881-94 (2006)
(rejecting notion of foreign affairs preemption on "bargaining chips" grounds). For
discussion of the understanding of states as nations as the basis for state sovereign
immunity jurisprudence, see Smith, supra note 186, at 28-50.
214 See supra Part I.C.
215 This analysis does not consider the matter of institutional choice, to which I
turn below. See infra Part III.B.
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Even duplicative regulation can serve an expressive function. It may
also continue a dialogue between federal and state law. 2 1 6
Regulatory-preemptive-mismatch null preemption occurs where
Congress inadvertently extends its preemptive reach more broadly
than its regulatory grant. As such, regulatory-preemptive-mismatch
null preemption will only be normatively desirable where it can be
argued that, though Congress made the choice accidentally, the
resulting null preemption is somehow normatively justified.
B.

Normativity and InstitutionalChoice

Some of the literature on preemption by federal agencies
addresses the question from the perspective of institutional choicethat is, which institutional actor (Congress or an agency) is better situated to make the decision as to whether to preempt state law.2 17 The
institutional choice question has potential ramifications for normative
evaluation of assertions of null preemption. First, one might view the
institutional choice question as dispositive of the normative question.
On that understanding, for example, if it is normatively desirable for
Congress to make null preemption decisions, then a congressional
decision to invoke null preemption is normatively desirable while a
regulatory decision to do so is not. Second, one might employ the
institutional preference as a heuristic to judge (to some degree at
least) the normative desirability of the outcome based on which
actor(s) in fact implemented each step of null preemption.
Commentators have divided over the related (and perhaps simpler) question of whether Congress or agencies are better positioned
to make the decision as to whether to preempt state law-i.e., as to
preempt but presumably with affirmative federal regulation on the
books. Some commentators are skeptical of regulatory preemption of
state law. 218 They argue that agencies lack the relevant expertise to
evaluate the importance of state sovereignty and federal-state rela216 Cf Schapiro, supra note 192, at 44 (discussing the benefits of redundant
regulation).
217 See supra note 118 (offering varying perspectives on Congress's and agencies'
respective capacities for preemption).
218 See Mendelson, supra note 118, at 708-25 (arguing that institutional competence and separation of powers weigh in favor of Congress making preemption
choices, and so the standard presumption against preemption should apply with even
greater force against agency preemption); Merrill, supra note 118, at 766-69 (contending that courts should uphold agency preemption only where Congress has delegated such authority); Rosen, supra note 118, at 796-800 (emphasizing, despite its
shortcomings, Congress's institutional advantages in making preemption decisions);
Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 118, at 27 (taking a skeptical view of agency pre-
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tions. 2 19 They also emphasize the importance of separation of powers
as a basis for vesting Congress with such decisions. For those who subscribe to this view, it is a small leap to conclude that agencies similarly
lack the expertise needed to preempt state law and in addition conclude that no regulation is appropriate. Indeed, given the affront to
state sovereignty, the potential harm to federal-state relations is
heightened even further, making agencies' lack of expertise even
more pointed.
Other commentators are more sanguine about regulatory preemption of state law. 2 2 0 There are reasons to believe, however, that
the reasoning these commentators advance might not apply as
strongly, or as broadly, to settings of null preemption. First, Professors Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld have argued that regulatory
agencies may often have more information and greater expertise than
Congress or courts, such that they may be well positioned to determine whether uniform federal regulation is appropriate.2 2 ' Professor
Catherine Sharkey argues that agencies are competent to consider
preemption in the first instance, subject to judicial review (with the
agencies providing information to the court to allow proper
review).222 But the question of whether uniform federal regulation is
preferable to a collection of state regulation is fundamentally different from the question of whether regulation is appropriate at all. The
latter question is one that legislatures typically decide. Second, Professor Sharkey notes that agencies' institutional advantage does not
extend to exercises of their interpretive authority.2 2 3 The question of
whether null preemption should be permitted to arise is often
emption); Young, supra note 118 (advocating restricting the freedom of agencies to
preempt unilaterally).
219 See Verchick & Mendelson, supra note 118, at 27.
220 See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 118, at 1990 (arguing that agencies may be
better positioned than Congress to decide whether preemption of state law is appropriate); Metzger, supranote 118, at 2069-72 (arguing that existing administrative law
requirements may facilitate the inclusion of states' interests in administrative decisions); Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 118, at 477-502 (arguing in
favor of agency preference of preemption decisions, with judicial review to ensure
proper administrative process); Sharkey, What Riegel Portends, supra note 118, at
441-46 (same).
221 See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 118, at 1971-79; Sharkey, Products Liability
Preemption, supra note 118, at 484-90.
222 See Catherine M. Sharkey, FederalismAccountability: "Agency-Forcing"Measures, 58
DuvE L.J. 2125, 2146-55 (2009); Sharkey, ProductsLiability Preemption, supra note 118,

at 484-490.
223 See Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption, supra note 118, at 491-502.

10o65

NULL PREEMPTION

2010]

(though not always) a question of interpretation, especially as null
preemption requires two steps before it can arise.
Third, Professors Galle and Seidenfeld, Professor Gillian Metzger, and Professor Sharkey argue that agency action on preemption
holds the promise of greater transparency and enhanced dialogue
between the states and the federal government. 224 These commentators rely on the notion that existing administrative law will compel
agencies to announce their intentions honestly and to consider the
views of states on the matter (which views will be solicited during the
rulemaking process).225 While this reasoning applies well to instances
where an agency intentionally invokes null preemption, it is more
problematic in settings where an agency tries to effect null preemption through the "back door"22 6 by, for example, engaging in regulatory inaction null preemption or by asserting that an instance of
unintentional regulatory-preemptive-mismatch null preemption on
the part of Congress in fact was intentional. In the end, then, even
those who would allow room for agencies to preempt state law may
nonetheless not be as willing to allow agencies to invoke null preemption absent some authorization from Congress. In particular, they
should welcome constraints on agency freedom to invoke null preemption other than intentionally and forthrightly.
IV.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF

NULL

PREEMPTION

The foregoing Part established that the normative case for null
preemption is narrow. In this Part, I consider the political economy
of null preemption. I shall argue that, as one might expect from the
limited normative appropriateness of null preemption, null preemption has been historically rare. I shall also argue, however, that occurrences of null preemption are becoming more common as industry
interest groups realize that null preemption is more attainable than
previously thought.
Under a typical (albeit somewhat stylized) account, oppositely
aligned interest groups vie for state and federal legislative and admin224 See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 118, at 1954-61, 1973 ("Agency proceedings
are more transparent than intuition might suggest."); Metzger, supra note 118, at
2074-76; Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 118, at 253-56.
225 See, e.g., Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 118, at 1954.
226 Cf Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53
UCLA L. REv. 1353, 1356 (2006) ("[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has . .. attempted to
capture the considerable benefits that flow from national regulatory uniformity and
to protect an increasingly unified national . . . commercial market from the imposition of externalities by unfriendly state legislation.").
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istrative action and/or inaction. 227 On one side, public interest
groups seek regulation to further goals as diverse as public safety, consumer awareness, and environmental protection, as well as perhaps
their own self-interest. 228 On the other side, industry groups by comparison often seek less regulation.2 2 9 In addition, to preserve national
markets and reduce the costs of doing business, they also often seek
uniform laws. 230
Sometimes interest groups on one side of an issue gain more of a
hold on government at one level than at another. 2 31 In such a case,
the other interest group may turn to the other level of government to
achieve its goal. Thus, for example, if industry is able to convince the
federal government not to regulate, then environmental organizations may turn to state governments for relief. By contrast, if desire to
attract industry motivates states to enact suboptimally protective environmental laws, environmental organizations may turn to the federal
government to set a national floor for environmental protection. 232
On this understanding, one can envision a scenario that often
might result in null preemption: Public interest organizations are successful at getting states to regulate in a certain area. Industry, displeased with the regulation, turns to the federal government and
successfully demands null preemption in the area.

227 See, e.g., Nash, The Illusion of Devolution, supra note 199, at 1006-07.
228 See Zywicki, supra note 179, at 879-88 (elucidating environmental organizations' motives, including self-interest).
229 That industry generally seeks less regulation than do environmental organizations does not mean that industry as a whole always prefers no regulation. Indeed,
commentators have explained that a subset of industry actors may welcome regulation
that falls disproportionately on competitors. See Nathaniel 0. Keohane et al., The
Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARv. ENvrTL. L. REV. 313,
348-53 (1998); Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public
Choice Analysis, 115 HARv. L. REv. 553, 572 (2001); Zywicki, supra note 179, at 849
(noting that industry, or a subset thereof, sometimes gains by virtue of greater regulation). Still, the overarching point remains that as a whole industry will prefer less
stringent regulation than will environmental organizations. Cf Keohane et al., supra
at 348 ("It would then follow that firms would oppose regulatory instruments that
shift a greater cost burden onto industry.").
230 See Revesz, supra note 229, at 573 ("Firms in [industries with strong economies
of scale) tend to prefer uniform federal regulation . . . .").
231 For example, one would expect an interest group that represents a large number of members diffuse throughout a country to be more powerful at the national,
than the local or state, level. For discussion and critique of this proposition, see id. at
559-78.
232 See, e.g., Nash, The Illusion of Devolution, supra note 199, at 1005.
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Yet, despite the ease with which this scenario can be explained,
examples of null preemption are not common. Why? There are
three possible answers to this question.
The first answer is that industrial actors-or at least large companies who trade nationally and have more money and power than their
local counterpartS233-are much more concerned with obtaining uniform national regulation than with avoiding regulation altogether.2 3 4
Second, and perhaps relatedly, it may be that it is easier (and
cheaper) to have the federal government enact a uniform law than to
engage in null preemption. Indeed, the traditional story is not the
one detailed above-that is, that state level regulation begets industry
efforts to obtain null preemption. Rather, a commonly found story
goes that, once rebuffed by the federal government with respect to
efforts to obtain regulation, public interest organizations turn to state
governments for relief with the expectation that state action will spur
industry groups to prompt the federal government to produce uniform regulation.23 5 In other words, public interest organizations may
lobby state governments to act with the expectation that the end result
will be some form of federal regulation that they were unable to
obtain directly. Needless to say, were null preemption foreseen as a
possible outcome, one would doubt that the public interest actors
would proceed in this way. 2 3 6
233 See Keohane et al., supranote 229, at 351-53 (distinguishing between sectors of
industry that face differential costs with respect to reactions to environmental regulation); cf Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 275,
288 (noting likelihood of some degree of heterogeneity among industry actors, but
concluding that industry will largely still coalesce around some issues, including opposition to pollution taxes).
234 See, e.g., Nash, The Illusion of Devolution, supra note 199, at 1011-14; Revesz,
supra note 229, at 573 (noting that, once a few states adopted automobile emissions
standards in the 1960s, the automobile industry "decided to end its opposition to
federal standards and became a supporter, provided that such standards preempted
any more stringent state standards").
235 See, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation:
The Case of Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 1499, 1504-16 (2007) (describing defensive preemption as when industry demands uniform federal regulation as a response
to varied state enactments). But cf Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The
Impact of FederalAction on State EnvironmentalRegulation, 31 HARv. ENvrTL. L. REv. 67,
98-106 (2007) (arguing that federal environmental regulation may "crowd out" state
environmental regulation, with the possible result of lower environmental regulatory
standards).
236 Cf Revesz, supra note 229, at 577 n.139 (noting that industry will seek federal
preemption to avoid more stringent state regulation, but also observing that, "[i]n
contrast, in states that had not previously entered the regulatory fray, the resulting
standards will be more stringent under federal regulation," thus implying that the
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Third, the notion of null preemption may appear unseemly to
the federal government. As I discussed above, null preemption
deprives a state that believes regulation in a particular area to be
appropriate not only of its ability to regulate, but also to see to the
wellbeing of its citizens by virtue of federal regulation.2 3 7 As such, it
can be seen as the apex of the use of federal power to displace state
law, and therefore as a substantial affront to state dignity. Federal
actors may also perceive that such a step would be quite unwelcome to
citizens of states whose laws and regulation are preempted without
replacement.
Does the rarity of null preemption continue to hold today, and
will it continue to hold? Demand for null preemption continues to
rise.238 Industries that perform in, and respond to, national markets
continue to grow.2 39 These industrial actors generally enjoy considerable political power, and they are likely to be able to exercise that
power at the national level. First and foremost, they will seek uniform
federal regulation. 240 But, all else equal, they would also prefer that
that uniform level of regulation be zero. 24 1 It stands to reason, then,
that demand for null preemption has increased, and will continue to
increase.
The supply of null preemption also seems to be increasing. 24 2
First, fully intentional null preemption on the part of Congress
remains a possibility. It requires Congress to declare that it believes
that a zone free of federal or state regulation is desirable. Given the
possibility of immediate political consequences from such assertions,
result of lobbying for federal preemption will be affirmative federal regulation and
not null preemption); id. at 557 (arguing that "environmental groups [should] come
to understand that federal regulation is not a panacea," and that as a consequence,
"they will be able to mitigate [an] increasingly negative feature[ ] of federal regulation: the threat of federal preemption of more stringent state standards" (footnote
omitted)).
237 See supra text accompanying notes 186-91.
238 See supra Part I.
239 See Issacharoff & Sharkey, supranote 226, at 1360-64; Nash, The Illusion ofDevolution, supra note 199, at 1004-08.
240 See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
241 Faced with the prospect of regulation, existing industrial actors generally prefer regulations that "grandfather" existing actors and impose more stringent regulation on new entrants. This distinction provides existing actors with a beneficial
barrier against entry. See Keohane et al., supranote 229, at 348-51. While it is possible that existing national market actors may have a similar preference, it is also likely
that the very breadth of resources required for an actor to compete nationally provides a national barrier against entry to existing national markets.
242 See supra Part I.

NULL

2010]

PREEMPTION

10o69

however, it would seem that such steps would remain relatively
uncommon.
In contrast, two other paths to null preemption seem perhaps to
be becoming more acceptable today. First, industry may be using the
argument that state regulation is duplicative of existing federal regulation as a means of getting the federal government to preempt state
law.2 45 And, if criticisms of preemption under the NSMIA are any
guide, then the result may be more null preemption under the guise
of duplicative regulation null preemption. 2 4 4
Even if congressional endorsement of intentional null preemption remains uncommon, executive branch embrace of null preemption-or at least executive branch willingness to interpret ambiguous
congressional action as intentional null preemption-may be growing. 2 4 5 This was exemplified by the EPA's argument that Congress
intentionally effected null preemption of motor vehicle greenhousegas emissions. 246 Executive branch actors may be less concerned
about the political impact of taking such positions. It may also be that
they believe that they can avoid political costs by passing the "blame"
as such for null preemption to the Congress.
V.

PRESCIUPTIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL CONSTRAINT OF
NULL PREEMPTION

In Part III, I argued that null preemption is rarely justified normatively. In Part IV, I suggested nonetheless that, while it has been
historically rare, occurrences of null preemption may be increasing.
In this Part, I first suggest ways that Congress might short circuit

efforts by regulators to introduce null preemption where that was not
Congress's intent. Second, I offer some suggestions as to how courts
should be true to the notion that null preemption is rarely normatively justified by policing such circumstances with special care.
A.

Legislative Constraint of Null Preemption

There are two bases on which I ground my prescriptions for Congress. First, the normative case for null preemption is generally a narrow one. 24 7 Thus, Congress might want to constrain regulators' ability
243 See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing intentional null preemption).
244 See supra Part II.C.4 (discussing duplicative-regulation null preemption).
245 See Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble, supra note 118, at 251-56. But see John
Schwartz, From New Administration, Signals of BroaderRole for States, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 30,
2009, at A16.
246 See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
247 See supra Part III.A.
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to invoke null preemption. Second, even commentators who might
accept regulators' superior ability to make decisions on null preemption would, it seems, base that expectation on the proper functioning
of the administrative process. 2 48 On that understanding, it is normatively desirable for Congress to take steps to force agencies to be transparent and honest about their decisions on null preemption and to
constrain agencies' ability to invoke null preemption through the
"back door."2 4 9
In undertaking a strategy to constrain regulators' ability to give
rise to null preemption, Congress might either take a broad approach,
or act on a statute-by-statute basis. Consider first the broad strategy.
An Executive Order already purports to require executive branch
actors to consider matters of federalism when considering actions that
will have an impact on states. 2 5 0 Some argue that, this order notwithstanding, recent government actions have not properly considered
federalism issues. 2 5 1 In response, Congress could codify, and even
expand upon, the existing order.25 2
Consider now congressional action with respect to particular statutes. Congressional strategy should be motivated by the setting of null
preemption that it is concerned may arise. Regulatory-delay null pre248 See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
249 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
250 See Exec. Order No. 13,132, 3 C.F.R. 206 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2006). For discussion, see Funk, supra note 118, at 224-26; Verchick & Mendelson,
supra note 118, at 26.
251 See Funk, supra note 118, at 226 ("During the latter years of the Bush administration, the status of the order can only be termed benign neglect."). For discussion,
see THOMAS 0. McGARTY, THE PREEMPTION WAR 242-45 (2009); Funk, supra note
118, at 226-30; Nina Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737,
783-91 (2004).
252 For discussion, see Sharkey, supra note 222 at 2174-76. An analogy may be
found in congressional efforts to codify executive orders mandating the use of costbenefit analysis in promulgating regulations. The Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit
Act of 1995, H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., was part of the "Contract with America"; it would
have codified much of President Reagan's cost-benefit analysis executive order. It was
narrowly defeated. See Amy Sinden, The Economics of Endangered Species: Why Less Is
More in the Economic Analysis of Critical Habitat Designations, 28 HARv. ENvrL. L. REV.
129, 136 n.21 (2004). The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 1532
(2006), however, did make it into law, and it calls for cost-benefit analysis for regulations that would introduce a federal mandate that would cost in excess of $100 million. Id. Its terms are not restricted to any particular subject matter. See David M.
Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: Beyond Administrative Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 555-58 (1997). For discussion, see Thomas 0.
McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Futureof the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
1463, 1476-79, 1481 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, ConstitutionalMoments, and the
Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247, 289-96 (1996).
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emption, regulatory inaction null preemption, and regulatory-preemptive-mismatch null preemption are the settings in which null
preemption might arise even where the legislature intended otherwise-or, even worse, where regulators might take advantage of an
inadvertent statutory loophole to introduce null preemption even
where the legislature intended otherwise.
Let us start with regulatory-delay and regulatory inaction null preemption. Congress may be accepting of regulatory-delay null preemption that lasts for some reasonable length of time, but not if it
continues to persist, and especially not if it becomes regulatory inaction null preemption. 25 3 To guard against this, Congress might put in
place a timetable according to which regulators are obligated to regulate. Private citizens could be granted standing to challenge a failure
to comply. 254
Next, Congress might include a "regulatory hammer" provision.
Under such a provision, Congress provides for the application of stringent rules unless an agency promulgates less stringent regulations
within a set period of time. For example, in the 1984 amendments to
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1970,255 Congress,
concerned over land and groundwater contamination, attempted to
minimize the use of landfills. It required the EPA to promulgate regulations that prohibited disposal of solid wastes in landfills unless it
could be established that "there will be no migration of hazardous
constituents" from the landfill. 25 6 But it also directed that, in the
absence of the EPA regulations explaining when landfills might
appropriately be used, their use was entirely banned.2 5 7 This would
253 See supra text accompanying notes 162-63.
254 For example, under the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, Congress has seen fit
to set out timetables by which the EPA is supposed to have issued certain regulations.
See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (4) (2006) (setting deadlines for promulgation of CWA standards); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7491(a) (4), (b), 7 4 92(c) (2006)
(setting deadlines for promulgation of CAA standards). Private actors have sometimes successfully filed suit where the EPA has failed to meet a statutory deadline. See,
e.g., Natural Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(compelling promulgation of effluent guidelines under the Clean Water Act); Natural
Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968, 970-71 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (compelling production of transportation control plans under the Clean Air Act). For discussion and analysis of the topic, see Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell,
Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 923, 950-71 (2008).
255 The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98
Stat. 3221 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
256 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d)(1).
257 Id.
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put in place a background federal regulation, such that regulatory
delay or inaction would not result in null preemption.2 5 8
Finally, Congress might explicitly provide that any preemption of
state law does not take effect until regulators in fact promulgate regulations. 25 9 This is the flip slide of the regulatory hammer: Whereas a
regulatory hammer approach averts null preemption by putting in
place a background federal rule that applies in the absence of agency
action, under this approach Congress would in effect avoid null preemption by forbidding preemption of state law until regulators
promulgated affirmative regulations.
Consider next regulatory-preemptive-mismatch null preemption.
Here, Congress might incorporate in legislation that includes a preemption provision and an authorization for regulation an additional
boilerplate provision directing that Congress did not intend to
approve preemption broader in scope than the regulatory
authorization.
B. Judicial Constraints on Null Preemption
Courts can also act to limit instances of null preemption. There
are two bases on which I ground my prescriptions for courts. First, the
normative case for null preemption is a narrow one. Thus, one
should be wary of accepting claims that null preemption inheres. Second, as I discussed above, the existence of null preemption may be
seen to offend states' dignity and frustrate states' prerogative to see to
the wellbeing of their citizens. 260 To the extent that the states have
empowered the federal government to preempt state law in some cir258 The Federal Boat Safety Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (2006), addressed by the
Court in Sprietsma, presents an example where (at least according to the Sprietsma
Court) regulators acted so as to avoid an automatic null preemption mandated by
congressional action in the absence of regulation. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537
U.S. 51, 59 (2002). The Act preempts state law not identical to regulations prescribed
under the Act. See § 4306. The day after the President signed the Act into law, the
Secretary of Transportation issued a statement "exempting all then-existing state laws
from preemption under the Act." Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 59 (citing Exemption to Preserve Certain State and Local Boat Safety Laws and Regulations, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,764,
15,764-65 (Aug. 11, 1971)). The Court explained that this action "was based on the
assumption that [the Act's preemption provision] would [otherwise] preempt
existing state regulation that 'is not identical to a regulation prescribed' under ... the
Act, even if no such federal regulation had been promulgated." Id.
259 Cf Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, tit. v, § 534, Pub. L. No. 110-161,
§ 534, 121 Stat. 1844, 2075 (2007) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C.A. § 121 note
(West Supp. 2009)) (enacting a savings clause that preserves state law governing
chemical plant security unless it directly conflicts with federal law).
260 See supra text accompanying notes 186-91.
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cumstances, the states might reasonably expect that in return for the
loss of sovereign prerogative (where the federal government chooses
to divest the states of power to regulate by preemption) the federal
government will regulate in their stead. Where this does not happen,
states ought at least to be able to challenge the null preemption-i.e.,
to challenge either the preemption of state law or the failure of the
federal government to regulate.
These normative points can be given effect in various ways. Consider first the question of state standing to challenge the federal government's failure to regulate. States ought to have greater solicitude
to pursue such challenges where the federal government has also preempted the states' freedom to regulate.
Note that this argument is consistent with the Massachusetts
Court's assertion that states deserve "special solicitude" when conducting standing analysis, while it also does a better job of explaining
why that should be so. The Court in Massachusettsindicated that states
enjoy, by virtue of their sovereignty, greater freedom to pursue such
challenges than do other claimants. 26 1 The Court's treatment of the
issue in Massachusettsis unsatisfying, however. The Court rested standing upon two grounds: first, the allegation that Massachusetts would
lose land that it owned by virtue of continued global warming 26 2 and,
second, the EPA's failure to controvert the plaintiffs allegations about
the anthropogenic sources of global warming and its effects. 2 6 3
Despite the majority's explication of the "special solicitude" owed to
state sovereigns, the reliance by the majority upon Massachusetts's
actual loss of land seems very much like traditional analysis that would
have justified standing for any owner of land under the circumstances. 264 Further, as I have argued elsewhere, to the extent that the
holding is grounded upon traditional notions of standing, the outcome may be good for environmental protection, but to the extent
that the holding turns upon the EPA's failure to contest the scientific
evidence, the outcome is very narrow and may not accommodate early
court challenges to government failures to react to future environmental problems.26 5
Resting standing upon special solicitude for state sovereigns challenging null preemption avoids these problems. First, grounding the
result in Massachusetts on the allegation of null preemption would
261
262
263
264
265

See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518-21 (2007).
See id. at 522-23.
See id. at 523-24.
See Nash, supra note 16, at 510 n.79.
See id. at 524-25.
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make clear that standing in such cases need not wait for the government to come around to-or perhaps erroneously neglect to object
to-the view that science on a particular issue is clear.
In addition, unlike the Court's actual reasoning, the alleged existence of null preemption plainly jibes with states' sovereign status.
First, the injury, causation, and redressability all directly tie in to the
failure to regulate, not the question of whether scientific evidence
adequately supports the need to regulate. The injury is not loss of
land, but loss of sovereign prerogative. The causation inquiry asks not
whether motor vehicle greenhouse-gas emissions are contributing to
global warming, but rather whether null preemption is entirely precluding the state (whether on its own or though ceded powers that
the federal government then exercises) from fulfilling its obligations
as sovereign to protect its citizens and resources. And redressability
would turn not on whether federal regulation of greenhouse-gas emissions might actually have a positive impact on reducing global warming, but simply on whether limiting the federal government's
discretion not to regulate in the area would remedy the loss of sovereign power complained of. Unlike in the Massachusetts case itself, it
would be clear that only sovereign states (perhaps with an extension
to municipalities) 26 6 would have a claim to such a position. Moreover,
the danger of the expansion of standing pushing the floodgates of
litigation open too wide would be very clearly circumscribed.2 6 7
Consider next that evidence of null preemption might affect
courts' resolution of challenges by states to the federal government's
failure to regulate and of state challenges to federal preemption. Specifically, a state pursuing a challenge to the federal government's failure to regulate should be allowed to submit evidence that the federal
government asserts preemption of state law in that area; that evidence
should favor a court ruling in favor of the state.2 68 Similarly, a state
pursuing a challenge to federal preemption of state law should be
allowed to submit evidence that the federal government has also failed
to regulate in the relevant area; that evidence should favor a court
ruling in favor of the state.
The justification for courts leaning more toward ruling in favor of
states in cases where null preemption can be shown is a presumption
against null preemption. Much as courts generally apply a presump266 See id. at 514 n.91.
267 See id. at 519.
268 This might slightly modify the presumption of Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821
(1985), that agency inaction is generally not subject to judicial review. See id. at 831.
The modification would arise only in a small number of cases-to wit, those brought
by states in which null preemption can be shown.
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tion against preemption of state law, 2 6 9 they should apply an especially
strong presumption in cases of null preemption. That is, where there
is no federal regulation whatsoever, courts should be reluctant to
accept that the government truly intended to preempt state law. The
standard presumption against preemption arises in areas where the
states have traditionally governed and regulated. 270 Preemption alters
the standard allocation of authority between the state and federal governments. 2 71 Null preemption upsets the traditional standard even
more: it effectively extends the preemptive force of the dormant Commerce Clause to areas of traditional state regulation. As such, the presumption against null preemption should be even stronger than the
traditional presumption against preemption.
In evaluating state allegations of null preemption in challenges to
federal preemption and to the federal government's failure to regulate, courts should vary the showing required to rebut the presumption according to the category into which the alleged null preemption
falls. The presumption should easily give way to clear congressional
intent to create, as with Machinists preemption, a zone free of federal
and state regulation. Settings of duplicative regulation null preemption should draw more scrutiny, but should generally survive; Congress's explicit conclusion that state law unnecessarily duplicates
existing federal law deserves judicial deference. So, too, should regulatory-delay null preemption generally be upheld; courts should defer
to an administrative agency's setting of its own priorities.2 7 2
Executive branch claims of intentional null preemption should
receive the closest scrutiny. In particular, courts should question
whether the null preemption is, rather than intentional, simply the
result of a regulatory-preemptive-mismatch on the part of Congress.
To give effect to the presumption, courts should demand a clear statement from Congress to this effect-or, if authority has been delegated
to an executive branch actor, at least a statement that the possibility of
opting for null preemption was also delegated. The Court's ruling in
269 See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
270 See Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Even if one does not accept that the general presumption against preemption broadly persists, see supra note 153, one still
might advocate the presumption in settings of null preemption.
271 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
272 This assumes that the agency is not acting beyond congressional direction and
not misrepresenting its intent to ultimately consider regulation. For discussion and
analysis of the processes agencies follow in deciding whether or not to regulate, see
Mark Seidenfeld, Why Agencies Act: A Reassessment of the Ossification Critique ofJudicial
Review, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 251, 258-67 (2009).
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Massachusetts is consistent with this view. There, the Court relied
upon language in the relevant statute to conclude that Congress had
not left the door open for the EPA to decline to regulate for any reason that it chose. 27 3 The Court could have bolstered its reasoning by
observing that the notion that Congress had intended otherwise was
undercut by its clear decision to preclude the states from regulating in
the area.
A still more ambitious use of null preemption would be to have
courts recognize a new cause of action under which a state could actually challenge the federal government's alleged assertion of null preemption. 2 74 The state would have to provide evidence of both federal
preemption in a particular area and also the federal government's
refusal to regulate in that area. By way of relief in a successful case,
the court could issue an injunction directing the federal government
to ameliorate the null preemption, either by vacating the preemption
of state law or, at the federal government's discretion,2 7 5 by agreeing
to regulate in the area. As above, the extent to which null preemption
would pass muster would vary with the category into which the null
preemption at issue falls.
273 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
274 Cf Rosen, supra note 118, at 807-08 (suggesting that states as a matter of
course be informed that a preemption judicial decision is in the offing, and that they
and their agents be given an unconditional right to intervene to litigate such
questions).
275 Leaving the option as to the form of relief to the government is not unheard
of. In takings cases, for example, the government may, in a losing case, decide
whether to pay just compensation or abandon the law that has been held to give rise
to the taking (although partial compensation for the period during which the offending regulation was in effect may be due). See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987) ("Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the government retains the whole range of options
already available-amendment of the regulation, withdrawal of the invalidated regulation, or exercise of eminent domain."); id. at 319 (noting, with respect to takings
that later prove to be temporary, that "[i]nvalidation of the ordinance or its successor
ordinance after this period of time, though converting the taking into a temporary
one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the demands of theJust Compensation Clause"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Kenneth Salzberg, The Dog that Didn't Bark:
Assessing Damages for Valid Regulatory Takings, 46 NAT. REs. J. 131, 144 (2006)
("[C]ompensation is only granted when the regulatory body takes too long to undo
the invalid regulation."); see also Vicki Been, Lucas v. The Green Machine: Using the
Takings Clause to Promote More Efficient Regulation?, in PROPERTY STORIES 221, 231-32
(Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004) (relating that the defendant in
Lucas, South Carolina Coastal Council, "argued that if the court should find that a
taking had occurred, it should remand the matter back to the Council to allow it to
choose whether to issue a building permit or pay compensation" (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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To see how this might work, consider the relief a court might
have afforded under the facts of the Massachusetts case had Massachusetts sought to invalidate null preemption. Absent a clear statement
by Congress indicating an attempt to effect null preemption, a court
would likely find the presumption against null preemption unrebutted. By way of relief, the court might then hold that the same interpretation of the term "emission" in the CAA's authorization of federal
regulation should apply to the term "emission" in the Act's preemption provision. 2 76 If, as the federal government asserted, the Act did
not empower the EPA to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases, 277
then the Act should be read not to empower the federal government
to require a waiver for California (or other states) to regulate greenhouse-gas emissions. Alternatively, if the federal government instead
wished to assert its authority to require such a waiver, then it ought
not to be able to deny its power to regulate such emissions directly.27 8
CONCLUSION

Null preemption is a decision by one possible government regulator-the federal government-not only that it should not regulate,
but also that no other government regulator should regulate. Insofar
276 Cf Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
("The plain meaning of the statute indicates that Congress intended to make the
waiver power coextensive with the preemption provision.").
277 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
278 Note that such an interpretation is entirely consistent with the statute and with
ordinary canons of statutory construction. Both the CAA's preemption provision
("No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any
standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor
vehicle engines subject to this part." 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2006)), and regulatory
empowerment provision ("The Administrator shall by regulation prescribe . .. standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new
motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare." 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006)), use the term "emission," and
there is every reason to afford the same meaning to the term in both contexts. Of
course, one might argue that the regulatory empowerment provision, but not the
preemption provision, subjects "emission" to modification by "of any air pollutant ...
which in his judgment cause[s], or contribute [s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." Id. But that is why the relief
suggested in the text is not a mandate that the federal government in fact regulate,
but only a mandate that the EPA accept that it has the power to regulate. The EPA
might still, consistent with that mandate, adhere to the position that it could decline
to exercise that authority "in [its] judgment." Id. Presumably, though, the courts
would constrain that possibility in line with the Court's actual holding in
Massachusetts.
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as null preemption disables state regulators (who presumably want to
regulate) without offering any regulation at the federal level, null preemption is justified in a narrow set of circumstances. At the same
time, it seems that instances of null preemption are increasing. As a
result, Congress should take steps to limit (or at least hold accountable) regulators who wish to give rise to null preemption. Courts
should examine assertions of null preemption carefully, especially
when agencies advance such assertions in the absence of congressional intent to that end. Finally, judicial procedure should perhaps
grant states greater latitude to challenge assertions of null
preemption.
Not all political structures that feature hierarchical layers of governments make similar assumptions about the allocation of powers.2 7 9
Only for those that do will the analysis here apply. Thus, for example,
the analysis here could apply to governance in the European Union to
the extent that the European Union arose by virtue of sovereign states
surrendering power to a new supranational government-with the
directives of that new government requiring compliance by member
states under the principle of subsidiarity. 280
In contrast, local and municipal governments in the United
States derive their authority to govern from the states themselves. 28 1
This optional devolvement of power does not lend itself to the analysis
here. 2 82 The federal structure of Canada also does not lend itself to
the analysis here. Unlike the relationship between the United States
federal government and the several states, the Canadian provinces are
creatures of the Canadian national government. Thus, the relationship between provincial and national power is quite different from
279

See generally JAN ERK,

EXPLAINING FEDERALISM

(2008) (comparing federalist

structures of various countries).

280 See, e.g., Larry CatA Backer, ForgingFederal Systems Within a Matrix of Contained
Conflict: The Example of the European Union, 12 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1331, 1335 (1998)
("Subsidiarity ultimately rejects the independent power of the networks of obligations
to impose normative limits on the power of the nation, except to the extent the
nation-state permits it.").
281 See, e.g., 1 ROBERT H. FREILICH, GELFAND'S STATE AND LocAL DEBT FINANCING
§ 1:1 (2009).
282 Cf Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Lodi, 302 F.3d 928, 956-57 (9th Cir.
2002) (holding that while CERCLA explicitly preserved state law, CERCLA combined

with state law occupied the field and thus preempted local law, and reasoning in part
that local governments may regulate only to the extent authorized by state government). Null preemption analysis also does not apply to regulatory voids among the
states, insofar as no state enjoys the power of precluding sister states from regulating.
For analysis of preemption questions among the states, see generally Allan Erbsen,
Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REv. 493, 498-510 (2008).
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what prevails in the United States.28 3 Future research should focus on
how the proper analysis of null preemption varies with the interrelationship among governments.

283 See, e.g., Nathalie J. Chalifour, Making Federalism Work for Climate Change:
Canada'sDivision of Powers over Carbon Taxes, 22 NAT'LJ. CONST. L. 119, 142-43 (2008).
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